I haven't been impressed with our response so far to Russia's aggression, but we could still come out in good shape. And the calculations are more difficult because this isn't a zero-sum game. And the scoring isn't over. And others might want to play, too.
To start with, when the crisis began, Ukraine wasn't in the Western or Russian camps. Ukraine was in play. After the pro-Russian Yanukovich rejected the European Union, Ukraine was being pulled toward Russia through Russian economic warfare and through Russian attempts to manipulate ethnic divisions within Ukraine.
But popular opposition put in a pro-Western government. Russia reacted by invading and engineering the annexation of Crimea to Russia.
If you look back on this blog over the Crimea crisis--going back even into the fall when EU-Ukraine talks were going on--you won't find Obama bashing. As I explicitly said, I don't blame the invasion of Crimea on President Obama. Putin invaded Georgia with George W. Bush in office, after all. Thug rulers do thuggish things.
Nor did I call for American military intervention to eject the Russians from Crimea or go toe to toe with the Ruskies by deploying to the Russian-Ukraine border.
My main hope was that Ukraine would fight for Crimea. Had Ukraine done that, we could have helped Ukraine with intelligence, advice, and supplies.
But we simply couldn't act if Ukraine wouldn't. And I didn't think it worth us fighting for Crimea, anyway. If we pressured Ukraine not to resist with force, shame on us.
My main worry from a presidential leadership angle has been our ability to limit the damage to our ability to lead allies and deter other foes from drawing dangerous conclusions from our inability to deter or reverse the invasion. I think our reputation for not being a serious foe or reliable ally hurts us in this mission, in contrast to the serious reputation of Bush for being willing to use force to defend our interests.
Although I will admit that I've had trouble with some (but not all) statements by the president and those further down the line about the crisis. John Kerry has been a particular focus of my contempt. But he's the worst secretary of state ever.
Yet it is too early to judge whether we will fail or succeed in reassuring allies and deterring other acts of aggression (by Putin or others).
Indeed, it is too early to know if this is just a Crimea Crisis and that it is over. If I had to guess, I'd say Putin doesn't have the military strength to fight for eastern Ukraine and so won't; and that his noise over this issue is just to make us heave a sigh of relief that Putin "only" wants Crimea.
But I could be wrong given that our response to the annexation has prompted the Russians to mock us rather than quake in their boots.
Anyway, the basic situation is that we were unable to convince Russia to abandon that annexation, and so Russia holds Crimea. The rest of Ukraine is leaning toward the West. So how do we score this?
In the positive column, Ukraine is leaning toward the West, now. They say they will conduct military exercises with us at some point in the future.
Also, you'd have to be particularly dense to continue to believe that "reset" with Russia is alive and means Russia is our partner in any meaningful sense of that word. Clarity has some value, no?
In the negative column, Ukraine is not leaning so much to the West that they say they want to join NATO, now. They still fear Russia enough to want to avoid angering Russia.
Obviously, Russia has Crimea, which secures their naval base, creates a forward front to threaten Ukraine from the south, and increases Russia's ability to project power around the Black Sea and into the eastern Mediterranean Sea.
Russia has increased their image of power, which is pretty amazing given their military weakness.
Also in this column is the fact that Ukraine did not resist Russia's invasion with force, and so remind Russia there is a price to pay for tangling with Ukraine.
Consider, too, that our new NATO allies are worried about being next in line for Russian aggression.
Then think about what China, Iran, Syria, and whoever else that looks at us when they calculate costs for action will do in the future.
Nuclear disarmament is also hit because Ukraine's territorial integrity was guaranteed by America, Britain, and Russia in exchange for Ukraine giving up a large nuclear arsenal that they inherited from the Soviet Union.
And consider that Russia does not consider our gain of Ukraine to be permanent if they continue to divide Ukrainians by exploiting/creating ethnic divisions and continue to put pressure on Ukraine to again swing to Russia's orbit.
In the short run, we have a major gain with the remains of Ukraine on our side.
The problem is the long run. Russia has time to reverse our one major gain--Ukraine's tilt back to the West. What are our odds of reversing Russia's gains of reputation and land?
And while our allies haven't fled us in fear in the short run, they'll ponder options on how to survive if we won't help. That could be nuclear weapons.
Enemies will surely be emboldened. While I judge that Putin could have invaded Crimea even if Bush (or Reagan) was in office, there was some effect to believing President Obama is a flexible push-over. Going forward, that component of enemy decision-making will increase. For some, it will become the decisive factor in choosing to act.
But we have time to hold our gains and limit the losses we have endured in our reputation.
Will President Obama lead on this? Or is our March Madness our ability to ignore the world around us while it burns?
UPDATE: Ukraine will attempt to move West as quickly as they can:
The European Union and Ukraine signed the core elements of a political association agreement on Friday, committing to the same deal former president Viktor Yanukovich rejected last November, a move which led to his overthrow. ...
The deal commits Ukraine and the EU to closer political and economic cooperation, although more substantial parts of the agreement concerning free trade will only be signed after Ukraine has held new presidential elections in May.
I may not think much of the European Union, but Ukrainians wanting to join the EU actually gives Ukraine a chance to increase their economic fortunes and political freedoms--especially when you contrast them to their fate within Russia's system.
What excuse to Crimeans have for wanting to break in to the prison of Putin's Russia?
