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Saturday, March 01, 2014

Actions Can't Be Hidden But Intentions Remain Unknown

A Navy intelligence analyst has concluded that China is training for a short war to seize small objectives and then sue for peace. This is probably very accurate since it reflects past actions. But there is another explanation for the exercises cited.

China has recently challenged Japan's authority to control the Senkaku Islands. So this explanation of Chinese military exercises in that area make perfect sense:

We witnessed the massive amphibious and cross military region enterprise — Mission Action 2013,” Fanell said at the West 2014 conference on Feb. 13 in San Diego, Calif.
“[We] concluded that the PLA has been given the new task to be able to conduct a short sharp war to destroy Japanese forces in the East China Sea following with what can only be expected a seizure of the Senkakus or even a southern Ryukyu [islands] — as some of their academics say.”

That explanation is perfectly reasonable.

It also makes sense because China has used the smash-and-grab technique numerous times over the last several decades in the South China Sea. So as China makes claims in the East China Sea, why wouldn't that pattern apply here?

But there is another explanation for the exercises that speaks of a more ambitious goal--the invasion and conquest of Taiwan.

Look at the map and and zoom out a bit. It is easy to see that the exercise area puts the Chinese navy between Taiwan and Japan (where US Navy units also call a home port). The exercise area also threatens any US forces that attempt to deploy from Guam to Taiwan, as well as helping Hainan-based forces interdict reinforcements coming from the Philippines, where we have base access.

Years ago, when I speculated on the form of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, I assumed that China would want a fast conquest and that the Chinese would not attack American or Japanese forces the way Japan attacked our forces at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines to keep us from interfering in their other conquests:

I ... assume that the Chinese want to keep this a localized conflict so they won't open with a Pearl Harbor-style attack on our forces at Guam, Okinawa, or any other US bases in Japan. They may not even be capable of seriously hitting bases successfully so far away. An ineffective attack would be counter-productive. Why bother emphasizing the internal nature of the conflict if you are going to internationalize the crisis by attacking other nations? When the war needs to be won quickly before the US and Japan intervene, why make it easier for America and Japan to intervene by essentially deciding for us? Why give the UN cause to get involved? Absent direct inter-state conflict, our response could be delayed critical days or weeks.

So the plan will be a direct and fast assault on Taiwan to win before any outside power can save Taiwan from conquest. The Chinese will have four main missions for their military in an invasion: One, landing nine army divisions and one Marine division on Taiwanese territory plus dropping three parachute divisions and one air landing division. Two, securing the sea and air lines of supply and reinforcement from China to Taiwan. Three, keeping American forces away from Taiwan long enough to finish the conquest. This will also include non-military measures. Fourth, the Chinese must defeat the Taiwanese army and conquer the island.

One of my prime goals as Supreme PLA Commander was to delay American intervention in a large-scale smash-and-grab mission:

Major fleet elements of the PLAN, including their carrier battle group(s), will deploy to the north and east of Taiwan to complicate any American or Japanese decision to send forces to help Taiwan. ...

If the US intervenes, the Chinese will use whatever anti-satellite weapons they have and will try to slow down the US by threatening us with attack. I think they will refrain from striking first but will put forces in positions that will be threatening to us if left alone. The time it will take for the US to decide to engage Chinese PLAN forces will be valuable. The Chinese will sacrifice their fleet to take Taiwan, if necessary. They think long-term, remember? So what if they need another twenty years to rebuild what we sink?

Just having their fleet out there forces us to be cautious about moving toward Taiwan to reinforce them. China would decide to strike first. And do we wish to strike first to clear the path to Taiwan? All that ambiguity slows down our reaction time, I believe. China doesn't even need to defeat us--just delay a fight with us long enough to conquer Taiwan.

Indeed, I worry that the presence of a Chines carrier dangling northeast ot Taiwan will hypnotize our Admirals who could be distracted by the shiny object. Who wouldn't want to be the first Navy commander to sink an enemy carrier since 1945?

The Chinese aircraft carrier would have a role in slowing down our intervention, too. China's first carrier was for studying and training. China's true carriers will be Chinese designed vessels. Those China probably wouldn't risk. But the old Varyag? If I was in charge of the PLAN (People's Liberation Army Navy), I'd dangle that carrier and some escorts northeast of Taiwan. As I noted, its presence would give us pause. And force us to approach more cautiously.

The final contribution of that first Chinese carrier to delaying our intervention could be to tempt us into taking the time to set up and execute the perfect naval strike mission. Sure, having sovereign pieces of US territory that serve as power projection assets is useful. And the Navy trumpets that mission in budget battles. But the Navy--deep down--wants to exercise sea control and take down another navy that tries to wrest it from us. It would be the best SINKEX, ever.

The Chinese just won't care if they lose that first carrier task force if the end result is that China has control of Taiwan.

So yeah, the Chinese exercises support a mission of seizing Japanese islands in the East China Sea.

But they also support the main mission around which the Chinese military is focused--the conquest of Taiwan.

Remember, at some point the Chinese are going to realize that their charm offensive is not persuading Taiwanese to voluntarily rejoin the mainland.