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Sunday, July 14, 2013

It Shouldn't Just Be the QRF at War

Establishing quick reaction forces in an arc of crisis in case a new Benghazi-type crisis takes place is great, but it doesn't get to the heart of the problem of waging war without thinking we are at war.

I've written that it is an outrage that we didn't rush forces to Benghazi in the 7 or so hours we had before the crisis ended (and we couldn't know it would end in that time, remember). Talk of not having special forces or armed drones in range--as if that is the only force types we could have used--ignores the many forces we did have in range.

Indeed, having forces nearby an arc of crisis from West Africa to Central Asia is one reason I want a robust Army presence in Europe.

So while this development is good for the narrow purpose of reacting to a single event like Benghazi, it does not address the problem of our military not reacting as if it is at war:

One aftereffect of last September’s attack on American diplomats in Libya (killing the U.S. ambassador) is the establishment of a quick reaction force to deal with any similar attacks in the future. One part of this force will be based in Spain and consist of 500 marines and six V-22 tilt rotor transports. The other part of the force will be based in Djibouti (the northwestern neighbor of Somalia) and consist of 200 army troops using helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to get around. The U.S. Navy has long maintained bases in Spain. The Djibouti base is a joint French-American operation. The new quick reaction force will be available for all manner of disasters and emergencies in Africa.

The fact is, we had special forces that could have been sent. This is an organizational response to a problem of attitude--not a problem of assets. If we had been a nation at war--or just a military at war--on September 11, 2012, we could have sent any company of infantry, Military Police, Marines, Air Force base security troops, or whatever was at hand, and sent them toward the sound of the guns at Benghazi.

It doesn't mean we would have dumped them blind into a Mogadishu-like situation. But it would have been on the way and available if we determined while they were on the move that we could use them to good effect.

So will these forces actually be used in a new crisis? We didn't give the order on September 11, 2012. What will be different the next time?

And if jihadis react to our new capablity by staging multiple crises at the same time, and these specialized rescue forces aren't enough, won't we be back at the same problem I am most worried about? Will our military be ready to send what we have even if they aren't designated as the official embassy rescue force?

Will our civilian leaders give the orders to do so?

Are we at war or aren't we?