Could the Taiwanese army actually throw a Chinese amphibious and airborne assault off their island?
Taiwan wants to field a leaner and meaner military of 176,000 volunteers by 2015, in place of its current complement of 235,000 volunteers and conscripts.
But the military fell 4,000 short of its goal of 15,000 volunteers last year, and likewise was 2,000 short of its much smaller target of 4,000 in 2011.
Recruitment is proving difficult in a prosperous society that offers young people alternatives and doesn't glorify military service. Unlike in the United States, political candidates here almost never mention military service when campaigning, almost as if it were a badge of shame. ...
Some young people also question the need for a strong defense, because of Taiwan's rapidly improving relations and expanding trade with its once implacable foe on the Chinese mainland. Moreover, given China's growing military strength, some think resistance would be futile.
One, I don't understand how serving in the military isn't considered an honorable and necessary thing to do.
Two, technology and training are almost worthless if the troops that must fight lack the heart to fight. While everything goes the way you plan, weak-willed troops with good technical training to use advanced weapons can do a good job. But when things go wrong, such troops can shatter very fast.
Consider the defenders of Constantinople in 1203 who lost their advanced fortress to a smaller attacking force (quoting Thomas Madden):
A small group of about ten knights and sixty sergeants led by Peter of Amiens landed on a narrow strip of ground outside the wall and near the shore. There they discovered a postern gate that the defenders had walled up. They fell upon it zealously with whatever implements they had on hand. It was hard going and dangerous, for from above the Greeks rained down on them immense stones and boiling pitch, which they deflected with their shields. At last, they succeeded in making a small hole. Peering through, they saw a huge crowd of soldiers inside. Surely, it was suicide to enter. One man, an armed priest named Alleumes of Clari, insisted on the honor of being the first to enter Constantinople. No amount of pleading from his comrades would dissuade him. His brother, Robert of Clari, was particularly upset and even tried to prevent him from crawling through the hole by grabbing his legs. It was no use. Alleumes scrambled through to the other side, where he was faced with an armed multitude.
Then an amazing thing happened. With enormous confidence, Alleumes drew his sword and ran toward the Greek troops. They scattered. Once again, the poorly trained Byzantine troops proved themselves unwilling to fight unless the dangers to themselves was minuscule. Because most of them were provincials, they saw no reasons to risk their lives for the sake of the capital. Alleumes called to his companion, who now crawled through the hole, drew their swords, and kept their backs to the wall. When Greek troops at other locations saw the flight of those stationed near the walled gate, they panicked and abandoned their positions along the walls. Soon there was a snowball effect as the imperial army abandoned the length of the fortification in a mad dash to escape the city--all because of the entry of fewer than a hundred crusaders.
If the Taiwanese troops don't have confidence that they can at at least make China pay for invading, they might collapse rather than try.
And China could exploit the lack of confidence in the troops by using cyber-warfare and signals warfare to issue contradictory or false orders to Taiwanese units. Taiwanese officers turned by the Chinese could convince their troops to disband and go home--perhaps even telling them that they are going guerrilla as war plans called--or lead them off on wild goose chases. Chinese special forces posing as military police could misdirect Taiwanese army convoys away from Chinese bridgeheads and airheads, or assasinate unit leaders or attack field headquarters to paralyze units during the crucial early hours of the invasion. Taiwanese pilots turned by the Chinese might turn on their fellow Taiwanese in the air or by attacking Taiwanese ground targets.
And that's on top of the general chaos from air and missile bombardment.
And all of that could build so much distrust, fear, and uncertaintly in the higher Taiwanese command levels that the Taiwanese troops become paralyzed into inaction as a relatively small Chinese ground force breaches the figurative walls and lands on Taiwan to advance on Taipei while the bulk of the Taiwanese military remains unengaged in the decisive battle.
Finland, which lacked 100 miles of sea to protect them from the Soviets in 1939, fought hard enough for long enough, and inflicted enough casualties on the Russians, to survive their war with Moscow. The Finns lacked numbers, technology, and geographical advantages that Taiwan has, but survived because they did not believe fighting was futile.
Is it any wonder that I wonder if regime change in Peking is a better long-term defense strategy?
As William Stanton said in that initial article, more important than my worries is that I don't think the Taiwanese worry enough about their island democracy.
