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Thursday, January 17, 2013

Abandoning the National Google Strategy

Instapundit notes McArdle who says that cutting our defense spending has consequences:

I would like to see someone specify how far we could cut. Should we be spending the same amount as China? Twice as much? Would that be a stable equilibrium, or would we be encouraging the emergence of global competitors who would then force us to spend more again?

When I think about this, I think of Google. It’s safe to say that Google spends more than anyone else on the development of web services, including improving stuff that they aleady spend more on than anyone else, and do better than anyone else, like . . . web search. You could argue that they should stop, because it’s a waste of money: they’ve already got the top ranked search engine, and webmail program. Why continue to spend money making those things better when they’ve already got such a dominant position? ...

I don’t think that many strategic advisors would recommend Google cut back its spending to the level of its next biggest competitor.

I keep saying that administration arguments that even with cuts that we will retain the world's most powerful military is not a defense of reducing our military. We get a lot from our defense spending that is missed if you just look at spending comparisons between America and potential foes, and especially between potential foes and the combined power of ourselves with allies.

On the Google strategy, that is what President George W. Bush intended back in his administration:

We know from history that deterrence can fail; and we know from experience that some enemies cannot be deterred. The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy—whether a state or non-state actor—to impose its will on the United States, our allies, or our friends. We will maintain the forces sufficient to support our obligations, and to defend freedom. Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.

Pardon the look of the undead archives. The background was once readable but Reocities seems to have lost the color pattern and blackened the background. If you highlight that post, you can read it.

We wanted to dissuade rivals from even trying to catch up and we wanted to reassure friends that we would remain strong enough to help those allies--thus keeping them allies.

Once we reduce our sights to just being stronger than our enemies rather than far ahead, we risk being unable to keep allies in our camp. Lose allies and our combined power declines, which then feeds on itself as even loyal allies are forced to recalculate the balance of power.

And even being equal in power compared to a potential foe does not mean balance. Consider what it would mean if America and China were equally balanced in power. In theory, that would mean that in a battle fought in the middle of the Pacific, the outcome would be in balance. Fight closer to our shores, and we'd have more power since we'd be closer to our bases and reinforcements.

But fighting closer to China would give China the advantage. And you know what is closer to China? Our allies who give us a collective power advantage over China. If we lack the power to fight China in the western Pacific, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Australia would all have to reconsider which camp they align themselves with.

If that happens, more alliance power is peeled away as states adopt neutral policies. Or worse, power is added to our potential foe if these former allies side with China.

North Korea is not a compelling test case of what future Chinese vassal states might do, eh?

Consider, too, that our spending dominance allows us to do things that other powers can't do right now, like fighting far from our shores; maintaining a powerful nuclear deterrent; reducing our casualties in war with training, logistics, technology, and equipment; assisting allies who lack key capabilities to commit their own forces; reducing civilian casualties with our ability to use precision weapons and to restrain our use of firepower with well trained troops; being prepared to fight any type of war in any place you want to name, rather than focusing on one narrow threat scenario; and using our military power for natural disaster relief around the globe.

I'll never say that we can't afford to reduce our large defense budget (McArdle thinks our budget can be cut). But as we consider our defense spending level, remember that it isn't that big of a burden on our economy compared to what it used to be during the Cold War.

And reducing our defense budget too far has consequences, even if we tell ourselves we are still number one. I'd rather number two be 5 blocks back rather than hear the pounding of their feet behind us.