I'll be shocked if Hamas is willing to give what Israel can accept to avoid a ground phase. I'll be more shocked if air and naval bombardment are enough to cripple the Hamas rocket threat.
Stratfor writes that nobody but Egypt is really trying to engineer a ceasefire in Gaza:
It is interesting to note the remarkable indifference of most countries that normally rush to mediate such disputes, the United States chief among them. Washington has essentially endorsed the Israeli position so strongly that it has no option to mediate. The Turks, who had been involved with the Gaza issue during the flotilla incident of May 2010, have taken no steps beyond rhetoric in spite of relations with both Hamas and Israel. The Saudis have also avoided getting involved.
The Egyptians have been the most active in trying to secure a cease fire[.]
The Israelis have an incentive to talk to the Egyptians to buy time to use force and to keep the Egyptians from feeling more pressure from Islamists to back Hamas with real support.
But it doesn't look like the Israelis are willing to trust their air and naval bombardment has done enough damage:
Israel bombed dozens of targets in Gaza on Monday and said that while it was prepared to step up its offensive by sending in troops, it preferred a diplomatic solution that would end Palestinian rocket fire from the enclave.
As international pressure mounted for a truce, mediator Egypt said a deal to end the fighting could be close.
So Israel says they'd prefer a diplomatic solution--which the Egyptians are involved in discussing--but how likely is it that Hamas will agree to a diplomatic solution that meets Israeli objectives of protecting their civilians from rocket attack--especially the newer longer-ranged rockets?
Not likely at all. I can't imagine Israel trying to re-occupy Gaza. But a large-scale raid to tear up Hamas infrastructure and grab intelligence (and leave intelligence-gathering devices behind?) seems likely.
Hamas is likely on its own--at least for a couple weeks. Hezbollah is busy holding its home turf and worrying about the fall of Assad. Iran is busy with coping with sanctions, pushing their nuclear program, and worrying about the fall of Assad. Turkey is worried about the rule of Assad. Jordan has its hands full worrying about an outbreak of Arab Spring--and the situation in Syria. Lebanon just isn't a factor with all its factions, problems, and foreign involvement stoking problems and factionalism. The wider Sunni Arab world isn't eager to side with Iran-supported Hamas--as long as Israel doesn't take too long to smash up Hamas.
Only Egypt is really a factor for Israel, and if Israel looks like it is trying to follow Egypt's lead, Israel can get some time to tear up Hamas without pushing Egypt to a hostile orientation. Just allowing free traffic of arms across the Egypt-Gaza border would be a huge problem for Israel. However little a military threat Egypt is to Israel in the short run, in the long run Israel cannot have a hostile, large, and potentially powerful (enough) Egypt on their long Sinai border.
