Early in the year, I figured that Assad didn't have enough loyal troops to hold all of Syria. I thought he should withdraw to a smaller country in an arc from the Turkish border (excluding Aleppo) down to Damascus and then down to the Israeli and Jordanian borders. With the population in those areas, I figured Assad would have enough troops to hold that territory. He'd need to withdraw supporters and key assets to within this border, but he could hold it.
In the summer, it seemed like Assad could not hold my original Core Syria borders given the continued attrition in his armed forces. That attrition is continuing:
The rebels continue to make gains. In the last week the highway from Damascus (the capital) to Aleppo was cut and rebel fighters were showing up in more towns and city neighborhoods. ...
The rebels are seizing control of sections of highway in part to prevent military camps or units from being supplied and to make it easier for pro-rebel civilians (that includes over 85 percent of the population) to get food and other items. Troops that are left without regular supplies of food, ammo and medical gear suffer from poor morale. This increases desertions and defections. Thus as the rebels grow more numerous (even if many new recruits have few weapons and little ammunition) the government security forces continue to shrink. The rebels are making a point of releasing nearly all the lower ranking soldiers and police they capture, and only keeping most of the officers and senior NCOs. This has encouraged more surrenders.
Yet retreating to the coastal mountains where Alawites are dominant seems too small to argue that they represent Syria in the international community. Abandon Damascus, and Assad abandons claims to represent Syria. But as Somalia shows (or Afghanistan), if you hold the capital you can say you represent the country, no matter how little you control.
With rebels cutting that north-south highway, it is even more apparent that Assad can't control that border. Assad has to retreat.
But he has to retreat without causing panic among his supporters. I still think Assad could control a Rump Syria of the Alawite coastal area plus an inland buffer zone from Homs to Idlib. Aleppo simply can't be within Assad's security perimeter. It requires too many troops to hold, as I've argued since Assad committed troops to that fight.
I'd speculated that Russian troops on the ground--marines in Tartus and a parachute regiment along the Turkish border, could prop up Alawite morale. That and economic aid could allow Assad to contract his borders. Moving loyal people and strategic assets into that border would be a nightmare, but what's the alternative?
One thing that might help is to have Syria's parliament declare Latakia the new capital and for Russia and China to pledge whatever multi-billion dollar sum is needed to build housing and government buildings in Latakia and the surrounding area to function as the capital. Then move the parliament and the lead elements of the government to Latakia.
With the capital within the smaller state-controlled borders, Assad has a case to say he still represents Syria. More important, it gives Russia and China a case to defend that claim.
Then Assad needs to hold on long enough to withdraw in good order. That's no easy task, I admit. And it would have helped if Assad had started this process in the spring. But whether or not time is short, Assad has little choice unless he is satisfied with just stretching out the time needed for the rebels to win. That might cut it when fighting Israel, but his domestic enemies are likely to be less forgiving.
If Assad can't control Syria with the troops he has, he needs a country small enough to control with the troops he has.
