The 100-plane option is something I've read before and assumed in my back-of-the-envelope musings. So it was nice to read that.
The map of Israeli routes in and out of Iran were interesting, too.
The report assumes 50 targets (5 nuclear facilities at Panchin, Fordow, Arak, Natanz, and Esfahan; 8 missile bases; 15 missile production facilities; and 22 mobile missile launchers) and 2 planes assigned to each target.
I am puzzled by the use of 100 planes for the US scenario, since even in Desert Fox (the 1998 strikes against Saddam's WMD infrastructure), we had over 200 planes involved in the four-day strike, plus dozens of British planes.
The report does say supporting aircraft to escort and assist in penetration would be needed. But they don't put numbers on that. For the US, I'd be shocked if we used fewer than the approximately 250 we used in Desert Fox since I assume a target set far beyond nuclear-related sites.
Plus cruise missiles, of course.
I have no idea if the assumption that a strike would slow down Iran with the initial strike by Israel, and if we carried out the raid we could tack on a couple more years with follow-on strikes and perhaps more with a bigger initial attack, is accurate. We assumed Desert Fox would set back Iraq a year, and we seem to have basically shut them down.
Israel is judged to barely have the assets for a 100-plane strike. I figured Israel could pull it off, but I assume that the main problem for Israel is avoiding telegraphing the strike by the inability to hide the launch of 100 strike planes, tankers, and supporting planes for defensive purposes.
So what if Israel doesn't approach the problem like an American planner would, and thinks well outside the box?
And what if Israel figures out a way to pull off follow-up strikes based on bomb damage assessment?
Further, I really object to the assumption that Iran stokes regional chaos in response. Iran will react in some way. But why assume the reaction will be so dangerous as to be catastrophic?
Did Iraq do much after Israel struck Iraq's Osirak reactor? No.
Did the Arab world erupt after Israel hit the PLO in Tunisia? No.
Did the Arab world--or just Syria--react when Israel hit Syria's reactor? No.
Did Iraq react after Desert Fox? No.
Did the Arab world react in response to Desert Storm? No.
Did the Arab world react in response to years of no-fly zone enforcement over Iraq? No?
Did Iran react to our failed hostage rescue attempt at Desert One? No.
Did Iran react to any of the 1980s clashes with Iran's naval forces in the Gulf? No.
Did Iran react after their boys in Hezbollah got hammered in 2006? Nope.
And Iran's response to Israeli cyber-war attacks on Iran's nuclear program have been few and someone embarrassing in their ineffectiveness.
Did anyone react much after any of a number of Israeli operations in Lebanon and Gaza over the decades? No.
Even the Iraq War itself had a relatively muted response. Yes, jihadi recruits flowed to Iraq--for a while until the suicidal nature and futility were too much for most would-be jihadis. And rulers still sided with us. The Arab Spring hasn't been a full-throated endorsement of anti-US feelings. Islamists may yet exploit the fledgling voting, but that wasn't the motivation of the revolts and protests. Iraqis sure seem to think their example was part of the motivation for the Arab Spring.
So we've managed to contain reactions well short of catastrophe, so far. Yet this time it is to be Armageddon?
You want Armageddon? Let Iran go nuclear and see a Middle East region develop with Israel, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia with nuclear weapons (and India just outside that region, making Pakistan antsy enough to keep building nukes). I got your Armageddon right here, pal.
I'd rather buy time with a strike rather than let Iran get nukes sooner.
The paper has a lot of interesting charts (including one showing ballistic arc altitudes of missiles of up to 3,000 kilometer range--those peak at just above 500 kilometers from the Earth) and illustrations demonstrating concepts of air defense and such. The sections on oil infrastructure and alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz are valuable alone). It's a good reference source, to be sure.
UPDATE: This article addresses the problem of achieving surprise:
Some believe Israel is still capable of achieving a modicum of surprise, and that in any case it might hope a combination of stealth, blunt force and, perhaps, hitherto untested innovations can deliver victory - even if Iran is on high alert. ...
"The probability of achieving surprise is low, but I think the Israelis will count on their technical competence in defense suppression to allow them in," said Walter Boyne, a former U.S. air force officer and a writer on aviation history.
That is, Iran can say they are on high alert, but in practice you can't be on high alert forever. Eventually you get tired and aren't as alert--and even have your senses dulled by repeated false alarms. Israel might count on that to achieve surprise.
Two, Israel may have some outside-the-box methods that will cause surprise to even an alert foe.
Three, Israel might just come in openly with as big a force that they can muster, and rely on technology and training to sledgehammer their way through whatever defenses Iran can muster.
Oh, and the article mentions sea and ground elements that could be used--as I mentioned here--as well as cyber-attacks--which I haven't mentioned until it became clear we were doing damage with cyber-warfare.
