Syria is Iran's biggest foreign asset, providing access to Israel, Turkey, and Lebanon and providing a way to influence Hamas in Gaza:
Human rights — decency — is reason enough to do everything we can to bring down Assad. But strategic opportunity compounds the urgency. With its archipelago of clients anchored by Syria, Iran is today the greatest regional threat — to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states terrified of Iranian nuclear hegemony; to traditional regimes menaced by Iranian jihadist subversion; to Israel, which the Islamic republic has pledged to annihilate; to America and the West, whom the mullahs have vowed to drive from the region.
So it is understandable that to Iran is trying defend Assad as the protest movement grows into an insurgency:
U.S. officials say Iran is increasingly active in backing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's campaign of violence against his own people.
As opposition attacks against the Syrian government grow, U.S. officials say Damascus increasingly seeks help from Iran to hold onto power.
Central Intelligence Agency chief David Petraeus told U.S. lawmakers Iran helps Syria because it is fighting to maintain its position in the region.
"Clearly the loss of Syria as a logistics platform, a line of communication into Lebanon to support Hezbollah, would be a substantial setback for Iran in its efforts to use Hezbollah as a proxy, and that is indeed why the Revolutionary Guards corps Quds Force is so engaged in trying to prop up Bashar al-Assad right now," Petraeus said.
How far does Iran go to defend this asset? The asset is supposed to benefit Iran. But at some point, does Iran forget that basic calculation and attempt to save their loyal attack dog by doing something that harms Iran?
Would Iran send in visible contingents of Iranian paramilitaries to beat down the opposition?
Would Iran generate a crisis in the Persian Gulf to distract the world from Syria?
Would Iran generate a crisis with Israel to try to distract the Syrian opposition from Assad?
Syria under Assad is an asset for Iran, and the West is moving away from the model that said Assad was a predictable--if unsavory--anchor of stability in a region we desperately want to stay quiet. Nearly a year of escalating bloodshed and unrest means Assad is no longer a factor of stability. The Arab Spring and Iran's threats against the Strait of Hormuz and their quest for nuclear weapons means that the region is no longer quiet anyway. So tolerating Assad makes no sense and the death toll Assad has generated highlights the disconnect between our ideals and our practices.
And with even the Arab League dictator protection guild willing to stand against the dictator Assad, Russia's desire to hold on to their most loyal arms buyer and ally could harm Russia if this crisis goes too far. So we have more reason to push Assad. Even if we fail to dislodge Assad, pushing harder against Assad will compel Russia to push back harder in support of Assad and his Persian, Shia patron, Iran--against the wishes of the largely Sunni Arab League.
The Syria Crisis has not yet begun to get ugly. Will Iran support their asset Assad even long after that support starts to drag Iran down with Assad? The Iranians have a reputation for being cautious and patient players. But even the Iranians can make a rash mistake that they and a lot of other people will pay for.
But we could get a lot from this crisis if our diplomacy is smart enough. Assad could fall to be replaced by a government less friendly to Iran. Iran could provide an excuse to pound down their nuclear program and conventional military assets. Russia could shoot themselves in the foot by alienating the Sunni Arab world.
Or things could just blow up and we get something worse. There was a reason that supporting the "stability" of a thug Assad was so appealing despite the moral argument for dispatching him to the netherworld, after all. What's the saying about "crisis" in Chinese is the same word as the one for "opportunity?" Whether or not that is an accurate language description, it is no doubt true in practice. Unfortunately, those words are also the same for "blood-soaked disaster"--in practice if not in language.
Which is why blogging about foreign affairs options is easier than being the one who has to sign off on executing foreign affairs options. I'll never deny that.
UPDATE: This article notes the angle where Russia (and China!) look bad by vetoing a resolution condemning Assad's killing spree and the West gets to look concerned without having to do anything under the authority of a UN resolution to actually stop the killing.
