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Friday, December 23, 2011

Recruiting and Retention

Assad has real problems now:

Desertion in the army has reached crises proportions, with several thousand fleeing each day. So far, about ten percent of the 300,000 army troops have deserted. New conscripts are not showing up, and defying the government to come get them. Most of the lower ranking troops are Sunni Arabs, who are over 75 percent of the population and generally hostile to the government. The minorities (Alawites, Druze, Christians) serve as NCOs and officers, but do not want to be on the wrong side of a civil war, and not every minority family prospered under the Assads. So not even the non-Sunnis are guaranteed to remain loyal, and one Syrian general is reported to have deserted and fled to Turkey.

Right now, the bulk of the army is not involved in suppressing the dissidents and insurgents. That ugly job is left to the loyal army units and secret police (and affiliated gangs and foreign thugs). The army's only job is to deter foreign invasion.

Well, the only job until now. Now it seems to be a recruiting pool for the armed opposition.

It might be wise to disarm the bulk of the army that is not involved in fighting dissidents. Give them riot control gear and sprinkle loyal Alawite armed units in them for both back up and to ensure loyalty. I think getting these units involved in restoring order without using deadly force or just standing guard might be useful. Keep them busy. Just sitting in their barracks brooding over the bigger picture clearly isn't helping their loyalty.

Otherwise, at some point, entire units with their equipment will start defecting. Really, if the Turks invade, I don't think a desertion riddled army will last very long anyway in combat with them.

It might be too late to keep the bulk of the Sunni Arab army from becoming a factor against the Assad regime, however.