Consider our air power interventions since the Cold War was won: Bosnia 1995, Kosovo 1999, Iraq No-Fly Zone Enforcement 1991-2003, Afghanistan 2001, and Libya 2011.
In Bosnia, we bombed Bosnian Serbs to defend the Bosnian Moslems. A Croatian-led offensive (that a US private military company--MPRI--planned, by the way) with the Bosnian Moslems cooperating with the Croats was the decisive factor in allowing the Bosnian Moslems to hold their territory in the face of ethnic Serb armed efforts to defeat them.
In Kosovo, an extensive bombing campaign (with our special forces on the ground) in support of Kosovo Moslems trying to secede from Serbia only gained Serbian retreat when American ground forces prepared to invade.
In Iraq, American defensive air efforts over Iraq allowed the Kurds in their northern mountain redoubt to hold off the Iraqi army; but in the south, Iraqi forces slaughtered their way to victory over the Shia revolt. Even in the north, in the middle of the 90s the Iraqi army moved against the Kurds to push the Kurds back from border areas successfully despite our no-fly zone. This example is complicated by the fact that American-led offensive air and ground operations heavily damaged the Iraqi army in the 1991 campaign that preceded the no-fly zone operations.
In Afghanistan, our post-9/11 offensive used air power with special forces (and spies) to support the Northern Alliance that was bottled up in their northeastern enclave holding out against the stronger but still weak Taliban armed forces and their al Qaeda allies.
And in 2011, Libyan rebels in the east were the main portion of the initial revolt and they held substantial territory as Libya's military disintegrated in the east. At Misrata and to the west and south of Tripoli, resistance took a while to gain traction and start to defeat the loyalists. Western and Arab support was key there.
American air power was obviously important in all interventions, although in Iraq the air power was simply keeping Iraqi air power grounded.
Rebel geographic bases were present in all interventions, including the failed intervention in the Shia south of Iraq.
All of the successful interventions had serious ground forces in the equation on our side. Although in Kosovo the insurgents were only able to sustain their insurgency rather than hold their geographic base in the face of an effective Serb army. Only the looming American-led ground intervention changed the ground equation there.
| TARGET | AIR INTERVENTION | REGIONAL BASE | WEAK ENEMY ARMY | US GROUND |
|---|---|---|---|---|
The faction we support needs to have a geographic base. The faction we support needs to have ground forces sufficiently powerful to hold their geographic base against the enemy's ground power. Our air power can be adjusted between passive air defense and active strikes to make sure the ground balance of forces is in our favor. If our air power can't lift our faction's ground power high enough to defeat the enemy's ground power, our ground forces are necessary.
Not to sound too obvious, but the rebel ground forces need to be stronger than the enemy state's ground power in order to win. Having a defensible regional base helps the rebels. Having an enemy army weakened from war or desertion helps. Having American air power helps. Having American ground forces helps. As long as enough of these helping factors lift the rebel army above the enemy government's army, the rebels can win.
Can Syria fit into this chart?
We could impose an offensive or defensive aerial intervention. Syrian air defenses would require more of an initial counter-air campaign than we did in Libya to suppress the Syrian air defenses, however. But we could check this box as needed. In a sense, the threat of Western intervention is keeping Syrian air power out of the battle.
Do the insurgents have a regional base? That's tough call since the insurgents are from the majority Sunni Arab part of the population. The Alawites have a regional base but they are within Sunni areas, too. So far the uprising is spread around Syria so I'd have to say that the Syrian opposition does not now have a regional base that they draw support from and can defend. As the report from which the above maps are taken, in the east the Syrian government is mostly leaving the insurgents alone out there, but it is too far from the core Syria to really be a base for the insurgents. The Kurds have a regional base, but probably don't have the strength to defend it now and certainly can't count on Turkish support. Plus, it is remote. And the Kurds aren't really rising up right now, anyway.
Is the enemy army weak? No. The Syrian security forces may not be strong enough to fight everywhere, but there are enough to go wherever they need to go and defeat insurgents trying to hold ground. A lot more defections would be needed to say "yes" to this, and it would have to eat into the core loyal army and security forces.
Is there a US ground force? No. And there won't be. But there could be a US proxy if Turkey intervenes with their capable army.
If we intervene with a defensive air intervention--a true no-fly zone--it won't be enough to let the insurgents win--unless the Syrian ground forces deteriorate enough so that they need air power to compensate.
If we intervene with an offensive air intervention, it would degrade the Syrian armed forces and make the insurgents more effective, but alone I don't think it would tip the balance. It took quite a while in Libya. It could take longer in Syria, depending on how much Iran can help.
If the Turks--who are vocal in wanting the "bloodbath" to end--intervene with enough force to establish humanitarian safe zones in the north, the insurgents gain a defensible regional base.
If the Syrian armed forces see greater defections, the insurgents gain strength while the enemy army weakens. But until government defections start to infect the Alawite core army and security forces, the enemy army won't become too weak relative to the insurgents any time soon.
If the US (or Turks) intervene to drive on Damascus, the ground balance will tip decisively against the Syrian government. But we're beyond the Libya Model at that point.
So there you go. The Libya model isn't a template for Syria. But the Libya experience and our other experiences do shed some light on what we might be able to do with air power.
Any bit of intervention could tip the scales toward the insurgents, but nothing is decisive alone except direct ground intervention by America or Turkey. I suspect no combination of intervention without direct intervention could rapidly overthrow the Assad regime. And unless the Assad regime cracks, the rebels must have a regional base to defend if they want a long-term strategy to win. If they can gain strength, over time they might carve a regional base along either the Turkish or Lebanese borders. Or limited Turkish intervention would create an instant regional base.
If we don't want to intervene with ground forces, the insurgents need a regional base. Even then, we might need some type of aerial intervention to win. We can say Assad must go. But we might want to think about ways to force him if saying Assad must go is the first step in repeating the so-called Libya Model.
