One worry that still keeps people from seeing this popular revolution/military coup as an opportunity is the worry about Egypt adopting a jihadi-friendly foreign policy. I haven't written about Egyptian foreign policy even as other bloggers have wondered whether the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty would be junked by a new Egyptian government. Unless the Moslem Brotherhood takes over--a long shot at this point--I wasn't that worried about that outcome. And the military says that the treaty will remain in force:
"The Arab republic of Egypt will remain committed to all its regional and international treaties," the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces said in a televised address.
Even if Egypt rejected the treaty, it would take a generation for Egypt to rebuild their military to a level that could threaten Israel. It is no longer a major military force as it was in 1973. And who would finance the rebuilding? America? We'd cut off all aid which would mean that the hardware would deteriorate. The Soviet Union? Gone. Iran? Barely able to fund their clients Syria, Hezballah, and Hamas. China? Well, OK, they could afford it. But switching to Chinese weapons would be a let down to the military and take a generation to carry out.
The military just doesn't want a fight with Israel. It is hardly a patriotic impulse to start a war you'd lose with no prospect of getting anything out of the sacrifice. And with Iran bidding for leadership in the Moslem world, notwithstanding their Shia and Persian status in a largely Sunni and Arab Middle East, Egypt could use an ally against a common foe to retain their status as the top Moslem state in the Middle East. Israel fits the bill on that score. And they have a common enemy in Hamas.
Egypt's military remains good enough to steamroller Libya or Sudan on their west and south, and that is good enough to secure Egypt. As long as we are a friend of Egypt (and betraying Mubarak to back the people of Egypt doesn't change that as far as I'm concerned), we'll keep Egypt safe from Israel even if Israel makes the stunningly stupid choice to consider Egypt an enemy.
So rather than focusing on worries of dramatic changes in Egyptian foreign policy, let's focus on building rule of law in Egypt. Really, working on that would lessen chances of a dramatic change in foreign policy by keeping radicals out of power.
Plus, I like to think that our military-to-military contacts over the last 30 years have given us friends in the Egyptian military to moderate any impulses for changing foreign policy.
This is an opportunity. For Egypt to gain real freedom; for the region to gain another example--less bloody this time--of building democracy; and for us, so that we can give Moslem people an alternative to Islamism when they seek to overthrow their despots that have mired them in oppression and/or poverty.
Fight for freedom.
UPDATE: Strategypage has a post that provides good news and bad news on Egypt's future. First the good news:
Israel now has to worry about Egypt doing something stupid. Although deposed dictator Mubarak officially maintained the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, Mubarak also had the state controlled media constantly criticize Israel for real and (mostly) imagined crimes against Moslems. Mubarak allowed Hamas to bring in Iranian weapons and cash (for an eventual attack on Israel). Mubarak did what any dictator does, he found an external enemy to blame things on.The good news is that with any luck, a government focused on doing good will stop their efforts to deflect anger about the bad onto Israel. sure, Mubarak kept the peace treaty, but he stoked anger against Israel. In time, that anger might fade without official sanction, making it less likely that Israel must rely on the views of one man to maintain the peace.
On the other hand, the fight for Egypt faces daunting obstacles:
But all of Egypt's problems are internal, mostly in the form of corrupt government officials and most of the economy controlled by a few hundred families. ...It will be a hard fight that we may lose. But hopefully, even partial success will be a major improvement.
While most Egyptians demand reform, those benefitting from the current arrangements know that they have thousands of years of Egyptian history on their side. Occasionally, foreigners would take advantage of this culture of corruption, which extended to the army, and invade. But the Egyptian ruling class would soon absorb the invaders, and the business of running Egypt would return to its normal ways.
Finally, strategypage notes the problems of rebuilding an effective Egyptian army that could threaten more than Libya or Sudan.
UPDATE: The military says it is committed to civilian rule as well:
[The] army said it would "guarantee the peaceful transition of power in the framework of a free, democratic system which allows an elected, civilian power to govern the country to build a democratic, free state".
No flashing warning lights so far. But we have a long way to go.
