After all, as Stratfor notes about Afghanistan, our allies there often have objectives different than our own:
•The United States does not want the country to revert to being a refuge for al Qaeda and other transnational jihadist groups. At the end of the day, this is the real U.S. national interest in Afghanistan. It is not counterinsurgency or building democracy or anything else.
•Russia does not want the Taliban to return to power. The Russians view the Taliban as a disease that can infect and erode their sphere of influence in countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and then move on to pose a threat to Russian control in the predominately Muslim regions of the Caucasus. This is why the Russians were so active in supporting the Northern Alliance against the Taliban regime. There are reports, though, that the Russians have been aiding the Taliban in an effort to keep the United States tied down in Afghanistan, since as long as the United States is distracted there it has less latitude to counter Russian activity elsewhere.
•On the other side of that equation, Pakistan helped foster the creation of the Pashtun Taliban organization and then used the organization as a tool to exert its influence in Afghanistan. Facing enemies on its borders with India and Iran, Pakistan must control Afghanistan in order to have strategic depth and ensure that it will not be forced to defend itself along its northwest as well. While the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban and the threat it poses to Pakistan will alter Islamabad’s strategy somewhat — and Pakistan has indeed been recalculating its use of militant proxies — Pakistan will try hard to ensure that the regime in Kabul is pro-Pakistani.
•This is exactly why India wants to play a big part in Afghanistan — to deny Pakistan that strategic depth. In the past, India worked with Russia and Iran to support the Northern Alliance and keep the Taliban from total domination of the country. Indications are that the Indians are teaming up with the Russians and Iranians once again.
•Iran also has an interest in the future of Afghanistan and has worked to cultivate certain factions of the Taliban by providing them with shelter, weapons and training. The Iranians also have been strongly opposed to the Taliban and have supported anti-Taliban militants, particularly those from the Shiite Hazara people. When the Taliban captured Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998, they killed 11 Iranian diplomats and journalists. Iran does not want the Taliban to become too powerful, but it will use them as a tool to hurt the United States. Iran will also attempt to install a pro-Iranian government in Kabul or, at the very least, try to thwart efforts by the Pakistanis and Americans to exert control over the country.
And our enemies have different objectives, too, even if some here think they should have the same goals as we have.
I disagree with Stratfor's judgment that we are losing the war, but I agree with their summary of what we need to do to win. Although I think counter-insurgency is the way to go right now to get there in order to strangle the Taliban and their drug lord allies enough to get them to give up the fight. I've always said my objectives for Afghanistan just aren't that high. As long as we aren't tying our victory to creating a centralized government in Kabul, I think we'll do just fine:
The end result in Afghanistan, if all goes well, will be a nominal national government that controls the capital region and reigns but does not rule local tribes and which actually helps the locals a bit rather than sucking resources from the locals, who in turn do not make trouble for the central government or allow their areas to be used by jihadis to plan attacks on the West. We press for reasonable economic opportunities, with bribes all around (I mean, foreign aid), to keep a fragile peace.
And we stick around this time, unlike after the Soviets left Afghanistan when we ignored the place, for a generation or two to see if we can move Afghanistan into the 19th century (hey, let's not get ahead of ourselves).
Hopefully our military surge recedes by the end of 2011 and we can get down to a single combat brigade plus air power that function as a fire brigade and a hammer for the central government should a local difficulty exceed Afghan military capabilities.
Oh, and of course the anti-war side will stop seeing Afghanistan as the "good war." The Left will start advocating defeat there, too.
My objectives for Afghanistan have never been high , and I think we could get there without the surge or the risk to our troops in landlocked Afghanistan should Pakistan collapse or turn hostile. But as long as our supply lines through Pakistan hold, a surge can get the job done faster and maybe achieve more.
One, I was way off in assuming our Predator strikes would be phased out, although I wanted an effort to extend our ability to fight across the border into Pakistan. And while I think eventually we can draw down, my hopes for the end of 2011 that I expressed nearly two years ago won't happen. But I still think the broad outline is valid even if my time line was too optimistic. Sadly, I was absolutely correct in how the anti-war side would turn on the "good war."
But do remember that getting allies to help us doesn't mean they check their own national interests at the door and sign up wholly for our purposes. It is nice to have allies. It is foolish to hobble our efforts to keep them on the line when their objectives may work at cross purposes to ours.
It's all about the nuance, people.
