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Friday, January 01, 2010

The Surge of Casualties

The press and many analysts--including those in the military (who may be trying to dampen expectations so the Afghan surge won't underform expectations)--continue to argue that the surge of US casualties in Afghanistan is wholly a function of the enemy surging there and making advances in the war to defeat us:

U.S. military deaths in Afghanistan doubled in 2009 compared with a year ago as 30,000 additional troops began pouring in for a stepped-up offensive and the Taliban fought back with powerful improvised bombs.

A tally by The Associated Press shows 304 American service members had died as of Dec. 30, up from 151 in 2008. The count does not include eight U.S. civilians killed by a suicide bomber on a base in eastern Afghanistan on Wednesday. ...

U.S. military officials acknowledge that the insurgency has the momentum and that more troops on the battlefield means the death toll is likely to remain high in the near term. Another 30,000 reinforcements are due in coming months, raising the American presence to 100,000

Over two months ago, I looked at battle intensity in Afghanistan based on our troop strength and casualties. The year 2009 looked to be more intense than past years, but I based numbers on assumed casualties for the final quarter of the year.

With the year over, what can we say about battle intensity and are the Taliban resurgent as the press would have us believe based on this metric?

I assumed an average of 45,000 US troops for the year and projected casualties as 350 for the full year. Actual casualties in Afghanistan for 2009, according to Icasualties, ended up as 312.

So what would our casualty rate be per 1,000 troops per year with updated casualty figures?

2001: 96

2002: 3.8

2003: 4.3

2004: 3.3

2005: 5.2

2006: 4.2

2007: 4.7

2008: 5.1

2009: 6.9

For the years 2002 to 2008, the average is 4.4 killed per 1,000 troops per year. The years 2007 and 2008 are above this longer term average, but 2005 has the highest rate, before we can speak of the enemy shifting resources to Afghanistan from Iraq. The rates for 2007 and 2008 don't seem like they justify the claim of a resurgent Taliban when you consider all the factors that go into casualty rates (see my linked post, above). Simple increases in our troop levels likely account for most of the raw increase in casualties.

In 2009, the rate was 6.9. This is definitely higher than past years. Clearly, it is more than a function of our troop levels, since the rate is obviously not reliant on the total in theater. Does this mean the enemy is resurgent that year? Even when the Dutch general responsible for the main front in the south thinks we turned the tide already against the Taliban?

It makes sense that the enemy is getting better at a faster rate than we are. The enemy started far below us in tactical skill and so can make progress in closing the skill gap more easily than we can expand our advantage. And we are using our troops more aggressively this year, which would also increase our casualty rate.

But despite the logic of war that says the worse side in terms of experience and training will show more improvements over time than the better side, don't forget that the enemy is using IEDs far more--which is a step down the escalation ladder from organized direct attacks on our forces rather than a sign of winning. The first article notes:

The AP count, based on daily reports from NATO's International Security Assistance Force, found that 129 of the U.S. fatalities in 2009 — or more than 40 percent — were caused by IEDs. The homemade bombs are hidden along the roadside or near buildings and detonated by remote control or triggered when troops cross simple pressure plates.

The Taliban were slower than Iraqi insurgents to adopt IEDs, but they now appear to be the weapon of choice against the Americans' superior artillery and armored vehicles, said a senior intelligence official with the international force. He spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.

There were more than 7,000 IED incidents in 2009 — including explosions, the discovery and defusing of the bombs or civilians turning them in — compared to just 81 in 2003, the official said.

He estimated that more than three-quarters of all American deaths and injuries in Afghanistan were due to the improvised explosives.

So increased casualties are probably the result of the enemy using a tactic inferior in terms of where they are on the escalation ladder. There are many reasons our casualties are going up, and those reasons aren't signs we are losing the war. My hunch is that our higher rate is mostly a function of our more aggressive use of troops combined with the enemy increased use of IEDs which then hit our troops out in the field more often. That does not indicate a resurgent enemy.

Work the problems, don't inflate them. Let's not panic in thinking we are losing, which is something war supporters are almost as guilty of believing as opponents of the war.