Even when the al Qaeda and Sadrist terror campaign was ratcheting up, I didn't believe that these threats could defeat the government in the long run. I worried that the Syrian- and Iranian-supported violence could turn into civil war, which would have greatly damaged our goal of democracy that crosses sectarian lines, but even that would not have defeated our main Shia allies who represent the majority of Iraqis.
Major General Caslen, of Multi-National Division North, describes the major threats he sees in his area (the transcript is August 11 and not yet directly linked. It will be here eventually):
The problem set of the insurgency is significant. But what you're seeing is the pressure that we put on the insurgence -- United States and coalition forces -- that pressure now is being transitioned to Iraqi security forces, both their conventional forces, their special operating forces, as well. It's already been transferred in the city, and eventually it's going to be transferred, you know, a year from now, across -- when all combat forces come out -- across all of Iraq. And what we're finding is the Iraqi security forces, with some hiccups, are able to maintain the pressure on the networks.
I feel -- this is my personal opinion -- I feel that the networks have degenerated enough that with sustaining the pressure by the Iraqi security forces, they'll be able to maintain the lid on them, and you're not going to get this tremendous resurgence of sectarian counteractivity that you saw back in 2006 and 2007. That -- you know, that's just what I see.
If, however, the Iraqi security forces either degenerate or whatever, and you -- or they are focused on the wrong directions, and there is a capability of one of these networks to gain some energy, that may not be the case. But I'm more confident in what the security forces have been able to do, in what they will do in the future.
The problem set with the Kurd-Arab issues is another entirely different problem set, and that is, you know, the strategic question I always ask is, are the Iraqis -- once the United States leave, are they capable of resolving their ethnic differences peacefully, at the peace table? And when I first got here, I was -- you know, I was
concerned about that. But based on some of -- because the answer is, they have the capability to do it. The question is whether their senior leadership will exert the leadership necessary to do that. And I'm very encouraged by the last couple weeks, when I've seen both the prime minister and the president, from President Barzani, get engaged and have -- has exerted some leadership to move this thing forward. I'm also very encouraged by the leadership that our embassy and General Odierno are exerting at this time as well.
So I'm -- so the answer to the second question is, I'm encouraged that we will get this resolved. If we do not get it resolved, then yes, it has potential to go towards lethal contacts, you know, in small separate areas.
So al Qaeda is alive and should be defeated unless the Iraqis screw up--in which case they could regenerate to kill more. But this is not the biggest threat to Iraq--though it is obviously a threat to the safety of Iraqis. Which is of course a major concern of Iraq--voters could punish a government that can't protect them:
The U.S. State Department said Tuesday that a mostly military team would go to Syria this week for talks on the infiltration of foreign fighters into Iraq and other Mideast issues.
But Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki planned his own trip next week to discuss the problem as his country faces a new round of bombings that have raised fears of a resurgence of sectarian violence, said government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh.
"It is not the duty of the American delegation to negotiate on behalf of Iraq," al-Dabbagh said.
"Security is an internal Iraqi affair and it is the Iraqi government that will directly negotiate on security with Syria next week," he said, without specifying a day.
The security issue is too important to Iraq to risk an American initiative that might not consider Iraqi interests enough if our administration thinks an open hand to Syria could improve our relations with Syria. The Iraqis have surely noticed that the Obama adminstration is giving way more attention to being nice to enemies than to friends.
Still, the strategic threat to Iraq lies in the Kurdish-Arab divide if disagreement goes outside the rule of law and the political process. Divisions are normal. Don't worry about that itself. Only going outside peaceful bargaining is a threat.
If the Kurds break away, the Sunni Arabs might fear that the numbers game and the assumptions have swung against them. In theory, Sunni Kurds and Sunni Arabs along with some factions in the Shia majority could balance the Shia majority in voting. But if the Kurds go independent (a bad idea for the Kurds, in my opinion) you have the Shias representing 80+% of the remaining Iraq instead of their 60+% now. So the Sunni west might want out of Iraq with fighting then centering on the mixed central region, including thej capital. The Shias would eventually win but it would be ugly.
I don't give the Iranian threat much credit. It is like the al Qaeda threat--capable of causing casualties but not capable of taking over Iraq. Even an Iranian conventional invasion in a few years would be decimated with our air power and residual ground power.
In the long run, assuming the Kurds don't get stupid, failing to instill rule of law is the biggest threat to Iraqi democracy. But don't lose hope. Sixty years ago, Taiwan didn't look like more than a corrupt society (tip to Mad Minerva). And now it is a prosperous democracy. If they can keep it in the face of Chinese ambitions, of course.
Which applies to Iraq as well, which we (and many Iraqis) hope will be an island of democracy in a sea of despotism and corruption. Democracy is an ongoing project that must be built and nourished over the long run. It is never achieved.
