After al Qaeda bombed our embassies in east Africa, we struck Afghanistan with five dozen cruise missiles in an effort to kill bin Laden. We also hit Sudan where we suspected al Qaeda was working with Saddam to make chemical weapons. While not on point here, I like to mention the latter since President Clinton and not President Bush came to that conclusion in 1998.
Anyway, the drive-by shooting at bin Laden did not kill him and it sure didn't scare him. Nor did it concern the Taliban regime controlling Afghanistan. The attack spurred more cooperation:
The U.S. cruise missile strike on an al-Qaida training camp in Afghanistan in 1998 was meant to kill Osama bin Laden. But he apparently left shortly before the missiles struck, and newly declassified U.S. documents suggest the attack cemented an alliance with his Taliban protectors.
And our government recognized that legal briefs didn't impress the Taliban any more than cruise missiles:
"Time for a diplomatic solution may be running out. Taliban brush-off of our indictment and other evidence may indicate movement from tolerance" of bin Laden's presence "to more active support," said a Nov. 28 memo for then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
It isn't true that using force encourages our enemies. As I've often argued, only using force ineffectively encourages our enemies.
