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Tuesday, November 13, 2007

Yes Indeed, And Then What?

I've thought for several years now that President Bush is determined to end the Iranian threat before he leaves office.

But efforts to build up Arab Gulf states and our missile defenses planned for Eastern Europe seem to argue that we will instead try to deter an Iran armed with atomic weapons.

Some here are pleased with this change. Others simply don't think it is possible to end the Iranian nuclear threat with an attack:


David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector, and his colleague Jacqueline Shire conclude that “a military attack is not an option”, even for the US. They say that even if Iran’s known nuclear sites were bombed, nuclear knowhow, components and fuel could be preserved or replicated – and Tehran would be all the more set on developing the bomb. “In such a case, the United States would likely be forced to launch and sustain a long, costly war against Iran,” they write.


It is quite true that we can't know for sure if we've hit everything. I've said as much myself. Indeed, crucial parts of Iran's nuclear program might not even be in Iran.

Once struck, the mullah regime must then be destroyed. So a narrowly focused surgical strike must be ruled out. But wrecking Iran's nuclear program and regime support elements only buys us time to later achieve the goal of changing the regime. I'd rather do regime change instead, or regime change while striking the nuclear programs, but I'd settle for buying time.

I'd also ask the question "then what?" of the option of letting Iran under the mullahs go nuclear.

Would we really be able to rely on deterrence to stay Iran's nuckear hand? Would the Iranians be even more free to sponsor terror behind a nuclear shield? Does a nuclear-armed Iran get a pass for terrror attacks using poision gas? Then what?

And what if Iran uses a nuke? Then what?

What if Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia seek nukes in self defense? Then what?

Of course, the very threats that we vaguely make that Iranians strongly believe might be straining the people of Iran to the breaking point:


Months of propaganda inside Iran, predicting a U.S. attack on Iran (to stop the nuclear weapons program Iran insists it has not got), have had the unintended effect of causing widespread anxiety about such a military operation. For their part, American leaders see little or no benefit in bombing Iran. This news is not widely reported in Iran. But more and more Iranians worry about the consequences of such an attack.


If the Iranian government gets paranoid enough, it might start to do really counter-productive things that drive a worried population or military to overthrow the regime.