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Sunday, June 24, 2007

Be Careful What You Wish For

One argument against attacking Iran is that it will play into the hands of the nutjobs since the people will rally to Ahmadinajad. I don't know if such a rally would be more than a short-term and fleeting effect.

Ahmadinejad seems to bolster the argument that attacking Iran would benefit Iran by his apparent welcome of a fight with America. They are boasting a lot of our impending doom:

In the modern military lexicon, rajaz functions as psychological warfare.

Against that background, recent statements by several key figures in the Khomeinist leadership can be seen as rajaz. These figures appear to have bought into President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's theory that a limited war against the United States is inevitable and that, once fought, will result in the Americans running away, leaving Tehran to set the agenda for the Middle East and even beyond.

What's odd, however, is that the Islamic Republic's top brass apparently don't share Ahmadinejad's belief that a duel with the United States would be short and sweet, let alone that it would end with Tehran's victory.
So his top brass are not so sure of the wisdom of assuming a fight with us would leave them strengthened (though last summer's Hizbollah War surely bolsters this belief). And are the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) less than unanimous in favor of a fight?

Low-intensity operations and proxy wars sap the morale of the enemy without giving it a pretext for using its superior military might against the Islamic Republic. There's no guarantee that any full-scale war wouldn't transmute into regime change.

The Guard has a more specific cause for concern. It knows that, in case of a major war, it would be the principal target of U.S. attacks. The Americans could leave the Iranian regular army intact while dismantling the Guard's network of bases and strategic assets. The Guard's destruction could leave the "mullahrchy" defenseless and vulnerable to a power grab by the regular army in alliance with the political opponents of Khomeinism.

Like I've written, thug regimes welcome only ineffective military conflict with us:


First of all, I don't know why we assume that Iranians who hate being ordered about by religious fanatics will suddenly be pro-religious fanatics if we deprive said religious fanatic dictators of their nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Perhaps they will. But I've seen nothing that seems to actually analyze this. Perhaps it can't really be analyzed with any certainty. I simply note that the September 11 attacks--except for a brief period--didn't rally nearly half this country to the government. Why would Iranians--who are actually repressed unlike the fantasy oppression here imagined by Hollywood types--be more loyal to their government?

And second, just because the mullahs in their twisted world view think that an attack on them will strengthen them doesn't mean it is acutally true.

Didn't the Taliban and al Qaeda want America to strike back at Afghanistan imagining that we'd be ineffective? Bad call on their part.And don't we now see that Saddam assumed that he'd weather any attack on him in 2003 and emerge stronger for defying us again? Once more, bad call on his part.

I hope we've cultivated ties with the Iranians for just such a power grab.