He notes that the key is, and always has been, defeating the Sunnis:
The problem is within Iraq and specifically within the Sunni community. The coalition and the Iraqis are creating the political preconditions for success and have largely confined the military problems to the Zarqawi network and the Sunni Triangle (where that network is, for the most part, based). But until we, working with our Iraqi partners, have persuaded the Sunni community that violence is counterproductive and cannot improve its political position, the insurgency will continue. That persuasion will require political incentives and military pressure. If we and the Iraqi government apply both in judicious measure over the course of the next few years, there is no reason we cannot win.
No doubt this is true today. The Sunnis must give up. I think we are trying to persuade them through political incentives and military pressure as Kagan says we must do. Carrot or stick, where and when appropriate. But a bigger factor than our carrots and sticks will ultimately defeat the Sunnis: their fear of something worse than living in a democratic Iraq.
One thing that will help them reconcile themselves to living in Iraq as a minority, as I've noted since summer 2004, is that the foreign jihadi campaign in Iraq will help forge a more united Iraq. Sometimes people note that the Nazis after 1945 did not fight and resist as the Baathist versions of these fascists do today. Well, remember, that when we conquered western Germany, the Germans had a bigger threat to worry about. The Russians were heading west and many Germans hoped that we might ally with them and turn on the hated Russian communist invaders to force the Red tide back east.
The foreign jihadi invasion of Iraq is giving Iraqis the foreign threat that can drain the Sunnis of their zeal to resist defeat by the Coalition and the new majority rule of Shias. A foreign enemy at the gates can focus the mind on what is really important.
The Kurds were with us from the start. Kurds still seem content to be a minority with civil rights rather than provoke Turkey by being independent. And the thought of a jihadi-run Iraq as a neighbor is additional incentive to stay in and make Iraq work. Had this key development failed, a northern war involving Turkey and probably Iran would have erased a quiet example of peace and reconstruction inside Iraq.
The Shias were brought around despite the mistrust caused by our abandonment of their revolt in 1991, by the vicuous and bloody jihadi campaign waged against civilians. Until then, the Shias were suspicious of America despite their gratitude for our removal of Saddam. Most seemed to just be watching and waiting to see if we'd win. Had this key of gaining the active support of 60% of Iraq's people failed, no amount of US trooops could have maintained order.
The Sunnis, I think, are being persuaded to join Iraq rather than be associated with al Qaeda sickos (and pay the price for that association). Defeating the Sunnis is just the latest key to victory to come to the fore that we (Iraq and the Coalition) must turn to finally open the door to a free and democratic Iraq.
So various keys are being turned to win in Iraq. Each of which, in their time, could have derailed victory. As horrible as the jihadi and Baathist terrorism has been, this pressure driven by an outside enemy is pushing Iraqis together rather than driving them to civil war. Slowly, all Iraqis are rallying against a common invading enemy.
Other keys to success will become apparent when this key is turned, I'm sure.
