Doctrine is great. But don't worship it. It might be a false god for the problems beyond the doctrine.
Despite the severity and urgency of this recognized threat from China, however, the United States, Taiwan, and key partners lack a unifying doctrine to counter an amphibious invasion. U.S. military doctrine “constitutes official advice” from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and while there are joint doctrines for combatting terrorism, counterinsurgency, and counterdrug operations, no joint, multinational counter-landing doctrine exists. A counter-landing doctrine would better align the military capabilities of Taiwan, the United States, and close partners such as Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. Additionally, a counter-landing doctrine would facilitate a rapid and cohesive military response by regional partners to repel an enemy invasion from the sea. Finally, the successful implementation of a counter-landing doctrine and its downstream effects would better deter an amphibious invasion of Taiwan.
The author recalls the complete lack of counter-landing doctrine in Britain after France fell to the Nazis in 1940. Yet Britain deterred an invasion with enough air defense, notwithstanding the lack of counter-landing doctrine.
The British results don't quite bolster the argument, eh? Although I think the author makes excellent points. And solid doctrine would be very helpful to repelling an invasion. And possibly vital.
But countering the invasion landings isn't the entire universe of Taiwanese defense problems.
In the end, aside from the lack of British counter-landing doctrine, I think Churchill had it right back then about what Britain would do if Germany invaded:
We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender[.]
A focus on counter-landing doctrine risks staking everything on stopping an invasion before it hits the ground. If the PLA makes it to the beaches (amphibious) and landing fields (airborne), piercing the crust of counter-landing capabilities, will the doctrine falter in the fields, streets, and hills beyond them?
Will Taiwan then have little choice but to surrender when the doctrine relied on is insufficient to hold the line at the landing points?
Taiwan needs to fight the Chinese everywhere. And ultimately drive the PLA into the seas, which I advocated in Military Review.
So don't let the pursuit of a too-narrow doctrine--no matter how useful for the specific problem--define the entire problem and possibly be the precondition for buying needed capabilities. Taiwan could just about throw money at the problem randomly and hit useful capabilities as this point, before pondering what the best capabilities are.
Unless Taiwan has an empire beyond the seas to carry on the fight until the New World liberates their island democracy, Taiwan has to fight everywhere.
And even if the New World is willing to gear up to liberate the island, the Taiwanese who would welcome liberation might be long gone and beyond liberation by the time those capabilities are built.
Yeah, the stakes are high for Taiwan. They must act and spend like like they understand that. Or they will most certainly go on to their end surely if not quickly.
And sure, draw up the doctrines. And train sufficient personnel to carry them out with good weapons and leadership backed by ample supplies and support. It's all going to matter.
NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
