America has spent decades using more military power to settle the Middle East to our advantage. That has largely been achieved. Although the gains need to be defended.
Bret McGurk, the Biden team’s point man on the Middle East who has now served in four presidential administrations, is quick to acknowledge that for decades, the U.S. has overcommitted and overpromised in the region. It is now putting aside the maximalist goals of transforming the Middle East through its largely discredited efforts at regime change or democratization—or, alternatively, its Faustian bargains with authoritarians.
That framing isn't quite right. Further, the maximalist goal takes time. Baby steps, people. And doesn't anybody remember the Middle East ambitions of the Obama-Biden administration?
As to over-committing and correcting that? Other than the repercussions from needlessly losing in Afghanistan, the Middle East is different than it was when America moved into the region in force:
Consider that until the early 1970s America wasn't much involved militarily in the Middle East. We had NATO, North Korea, and Vietnam to draw our attention. And in the Middle East, Britain was the guarantor of acceptable peace.
But then things happened.
And I go into that. And the result was that American military power focused on the Middle East for four decades.
And since we surged troops to the Middle East?
So it is possible for America to reduce our combat role and rely on local allies and on our proven ability to rapidly deploy forces if they are needed. The problem is that in the visuals the world has gotten used to seeing a lot of American forces in combat as a concrete demonstration of our commitment.
But a reduction in our military power doesn't mean our commitment is lower. It means the need for our military power in the region to back our commitment is going down after spiking from about 1973 to 2009 (although the surges in Afghanistan extended that to 2011 or so). Eventually locals will get used to our lower footprint and lower level of direct combat without thinking it means less commitment.
And of course, our need to refocus on Russia and China means we can't afford to keep as many troops in the region if we don't have to. And because of our past efforts at higher levels of troop commitment, we can reduce--but not eliminate--our military presence.
So yeah, our troop strength is dropping. Iraq kills jihadis. Iran now faces an alliance between Israel and Arab states. India is a new ally in the east. The Palestinians no longer hold regional peace hostage. Heck, even Britain has returned East of Suez.
And America is not dependent on Middle East energy exports (although we have allies reliant on that).
Our "retreat" from the Middle East is the result of changing circumstances and our hard-won successes. The region is good enough. And we have bigger problems. So America can return our force posture closer to what it was in the early 1970s. But backed by superior abilities to reconstitute power there in emergencies.
It doesn't mean our Middle East problems are over. Afghanistan suddenly became a gaping hole in our security. And our means are limited.
Success is merely the entry ticket for the next problem. But we have smaller problems and have allies in the region.
This is as good as it gets, people. Don't demand bike-path politics for your standard of success.
