American control of the seas is not something that can be assumed. Several problems must be overcome over here before confronting the problem of controlling the seas.
Will America do what it takes to build and train a Navy (and air power) to control the seas?
U.S. naval dominance is neither a foregone conclusion nor a legacy of progress or American exceptionalism. It cannot and should not be assumed in the 21st century. U.S. naval power—and its strength relative to other nations or navies—is instead a choice to be made by the American people through the actions of their elected representatives. ...
In the 21st century, the United States again finds itself competing with great powers. The triservice maritime strategy, Advantage at Sea, offers the Sea Services’ institutional assessment of themselves and their desires. But it is the American people, and the role they want the nation to play in the world, who will inform how Congress acts and will dictate the next peak or trough in American naval power.
It is true that the choice of elected representatives backed by public approval is necessary to build the ships and infrastructure to support them. These actors can provide the money and oversight to make sure the ships are well designed without cost overruns and built competently in needed numbers.
But the problem isn't just getting the money and building ships efficiently. Clausewitz spoke of a trinity as the basis for a nation-state sustaining a war. Once money and shipbuilding competence is assured there is another issue. And that issue is that the Navy is run by people who must effectively use what they are provided.
I am very worried that even if the government and people invest in more sea power that woke lips in the Navy will sink our ships (quoting an article):
Is the U.S. Navy ready for war? A new report prepared by Marine Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle and Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, both retired, for members of Congress paints a portrait of the Navy as an institution adrift. The report, reviewed exclusively by the Journal, concludes that the surface Navy is not focused on preparing for war and is weathering a crisis in leadership and culture.
That problem will deny even a larger Navy the ability to control the seas.
Focusing on just getting the money to build ships simply means more expensive American wreckage and dead sailors at the bottom of the seas that someone else will control.
