Is the Russia-Belarus relationship just more of the same?
I thought Russia managed to embrace Belarus more closely--perhaps decisively--earlier this year.
Russia’s plate as concerns the post-Soviet space, in particular, is already full. The costs of its conflicts with the West and Ukraine are significant. Pro-Russian forces have difficulties recovering from continuous electoral defeats in Ukraine and Moldova. The Caucasus and Central Asia are increasingly turning into zones of instability. The U.S. withdrawal from and the expansion of the Taliban’s control in Afghanistan threaten the stability of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, while the domestic situation in Kyrgyzstan is troubling. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is de-frozen and requires permanent involvement. In this situation, the Kremlin must tread carefully when considering whether to open yet another “front” in Belarus. Moscow should realize that any miscalculated move can stir a new crisis in the neighboring country with unpredictable consequences. Sticking to the status quo in such circumstances appears to be a much more rational strategy.
The list of concerns Russia faces certainly calls into question Putin's reputation as a master chess player. So good call on that. I'm not in awe of Putin's achievements.
The "too busy to achieve control of Belarus" angle is interesting. If NATO is truly the lethal threat Putin claims it is--SPOILER ALERT, NATO isn't although Russia needs to pretend it is--why would Russia let the stability of Tajikistan stay their hand in securing Belarus, which is quite possibly the most important territory in Europe today, if Russia got the opportunity?
But if this is an accurate sense of Russia's priorities, does it indicate that Putin wants to pivot to the east?
Still, just narrowly on Belarus, at what point does "just" more of the same kinds of links between weak Belarus and stronger Russia cross over into decisive control?
