Don't cripple our conventional Army's ability to win a high-intensity military campaign against military peers by assuming victory.
I am completely and totally against having ground units dedicated to stability operation units:
The author believes that the U.S. (and allies) require specific formations to conduct post-LCSO stability operations (hereafter referred to as stability operations).
The author looks at several options to achieve that objective. But the premise is misleading. Specific formations to achieve that mission are not the only way to achieve the mission.
I rejected this well before TDR, when the force proposed was a Army Constabulary Force (ACF):
Although Col. Fastabend and Lt. Col. Arbona rightly reject the concept of an ACF, they effectively argue for diverting the few combat units the Army has to the plethora of missions that operations other than war represent. While these are missions the Army must master, the world is not so benign and the Army not so dominant that the Service can slash its heavy forces to carry out every operation that compassion can conceive. Unfortunately, all three authors, coming from different perspectives, would reduce the Army's deployable combat forces by design or effect.
The United States does not need a Peace Corps in battle dress uniforms. The proposed constabulary will not only fail to alleviate the high operational tempo U.S. forces are committed to in operations other than war, it will threaten the Regular Army by creating another force that will compete with the Army for people and resources. The ACF will look like soldiers, but they will not be soldiers. Ultimately, they will be called upon to fight as if they were soldiers. If they are recruited and trained on the basis of their nonviolent mission, the shock of combat will be all the greater.
My view is that any good soldier can do the job if led by officers who understand the concepts and tactics of stability operations:
Any good soldier makes a good counter-insurgent. If led by leaders who understand counter-insurgency and can give the appropriate orders. So sayeth Strategypage, as it notes the Army's commitment to preparing for counter-insurgency and conventional high tempo combat[.] ...
To me, the danger of creating separate conventional units dedicated just to counter-insurgency is that leaders would forget that they aren't equipped or trained to face conventional foes yet those leaders will send them into such a fight because they sure look like any other soldier--and then they'd die in large numbers and fail to accomplish their mission. Call them a constabulary corps or whatever hip new term you want to come up with, but they would still just be second-tier soldiers--mere para-military forces that would be chewed up in high intensity combat.
Any good soldier can be a good counter-insurgent. All we need to do is make sure they're led by good counter-insurgent leaders.
I will say that I think having multiple headquarters for each brigade might be the solution:
Should the Army model the Navy practice of assigning "gold" and "blue" crews for some of its ships that have the crews fly in to crew the ship without bringing the ship (or subs, which do come back to home port for the swap, I think) home?
The Army could start to think of the combat brigades and its units as platforms and think of the command element as the crew.
Rather than having brigades assigned to either conventional or irregular warfare (and I've long thought that units assigned exclusively to the latter role--by whatever new term you want to call them--become worthless for the former), the Army could use its plethora of officers to create Blue and Gold command elements that focus on conventional or irregular missions (perhaps Red for conventional and Blue for COIN?) that can utilize the basic good soldier for new brigade missions.
Heck, add in other colors if you want specializations in urban missions (Gray) or whatever (e.g., White for Arctic, Green for jungle, Brown for mountain).
Remember, the Marines are no longer a second army. They were once the most significant "allied" force to help the Army overseas. The Marines have rejoined the fleet.
The Army can't afford to reduce its organic ability to defeat enemy armies. Don't assume victory in that war. Reject creating Army units that are "softer" and less capable of winning--or even surviving--high-intensity combat.
