A third lesson learned from EDI is the importance of investing in less glamorous but vital capabilities, those related to infrastructure and logistics. To deter additional Russian aggression in eastern Europe, the U.S. has used EDI to invest in airfields and other infrastructure necessary to transport and support combat forces. In his February testimony, Wolters suggested those critical investments have been essential in building credible U.S. deterrence.
That is exactly what the U.S. and its partners in the Indo-Pacific need to do to deter and defeat Beijing’s aggression. A recent report by Indo-Pacific Command emphasizes the role of infrastructure in “distributing forward-deployed forces across the breadth and depth of the battle space.” That will require investment in the first and second island chains to facilitate the survival, mobility, dispersal, and lethality of U.S. forces.
America needs to be able to further stretch China's military around their periphery to dilute Chinese power and make China worry that significant American combat power can show up anywhere to bolster regional allies that China might try to pick off.
If the Army is to have a role, potentially employing its core competency of large-scale combat operations as I suggested in Military Review, this is critical.
UPDATE: And because I can, I'll again lament that INDOPACOM isn't called PAINCOM.
A lost opportunity, I say.
