In 1996, drawing lessons from Iraq's 1980 invasion of Iran for the Army, I was skeptical that advanced technology would be decisive against fanatics willing to die in place defending a city:
The demonstration that troops apparently hopelessly outclassed can make a good showing - even if they have to do nothing more complicated than die in place in their bunkers - is useful. Iran's ill-coordinated light infantry forces were stubborn obstacles to Iraq's ambitions when deployed in the cities of Khuzestan. Fighting a determined foe block by block and house by house as the Iraqis did in Khorramshahr would force our Army to play by our enemy's rules. Although it is possible that information dominance could extend our superiority in open warfare to urban areas, that breakthrough has not happened. We must not forget that urban conditions may limit our technological and training advantages, lest we experience our own Khorramshahr debacle one day.
Fast forward to the 2016-2017 Battle for Mosul in Iraq War 2.0:
The battle for Mosul raged white-hot for nine months, with both sides teetering on the cusp of culmination by the summer of 2017. Eventually, the combined industrial might of the Iraqi-Coalition partnership won out, resulting in control of the city slipping from the Islamic State’s grasp and its army all but destroyed. Prime Minister Haider Abadi declared victory in Mosul in July 2017, but the fighting carried on at a low simmer until August, when the Islamic State’s final holdouts were defeated. ...
Modern technology such as drones, robots and precision strike did not save the day in Mosul. Brute force, willpower and attrition won the day.
The Army needs to know how to fight in cities if it must. The Russians didn't know how and so had to pay the price for taking Grozny twice.
But the Army should avoid it whenever possible. Why would the Army--short of needing to liberate a friendly city of great importance as the Iraqis needed to do--eagerly enter such a battlefield?
