New research shows that permanent troop deployments have little impact on America’s ability to deter aggression overseas, while carrying significant costs of their own.
A couple problems with this--and my nearly 40-year-old memory of this may be hazy--is cause and effect, and ranking relative importance of the crisis to both sides.
Really, if Side A in a crisis threatens to attack Country B but has no intention of doing so, and Side C deploys a carrier, air wing, or ground brigade in defense of Country B, did Side C really change Side A's actions when we see Side A does not invade?
I don't think internal factors get emphasized enough as opposed to external factors when examining foreign decision-making in crises. Not that external factors are irrelevant or can't be dominant in some crises, but in general internal forces are not counted enough.
Probably because they are harder to study. And that's a basic problem if we are always looking under the lamp post for our data.
Also, I have problems with definitions. So American forces in South Korea during the late Obama era didn't deter North Korea from attacking South Korean forces and that illustrates how bases are inferior to the ability to deploy quickly? That failure to deter attacks existed long before Obama. Our troops deter an invasion and not all forms of aggression.
And if basing troops overseas is unimportant, that ignores the role of bases in sustaining deployments. Is moving troops to an area really a deterrent if the potential enemy knows you can't fight for long because you have to build your logistics link from scratch to sustain your troops in the area?
Oh, as I get to the end of the article I finally noticed the main author, who is the same author of the old book. Heh.
