This author says that domestic issues like Khabarovsk protests and the size of the problem will deter Russia absent clear indications that Lukashenko has failed to end the Belarus protests.
But this is odd:
The information fog that allowed Moscow to stealthily occupy and take Crimea and start its covert, hybrid war in the Donbas has lifted. A Kremlin invasion of Belarus and its consequences would be fully reported by social media in that country. Russian forces would look just as ugly on social media as President Bashar al-Assad’s troops did as they cracked down on protesters at the start of the Arab Spring in Syria.
The idea that Russia somehow hid their invasion of Crimea is nonsense. I was able to call that on February 28, 2014!
The whole "hybrid war" concept is "analysis paralysis" BS:
Good Lord people, Russian "hybrid warfare" is just Russian aggression that we pretend isn't happening. Sadly, there's nothing new or novel about that.
Russia would face 10,000,000 people and a pretty sizable expanse of territory to occupy. How many people would become anti-Russian if Putin invades? How many Belarusian security forces would side with Russia?
Just moving into Belarus will strain Russia's ability to mass reasonably effective units and and their logistics. If Belarusians mostly resist, standard counter-insurgency math says Russia would need 200,000 security forces to pacify the country. But if there isn't armed resistance by all Belarusians, that number can go down dramatically. And if significant Belarusian security forces join with the Russians that reduces Russia's burden.
Russia is already busy in the Donbas stalemate and in holding Crimea; and Russia is spending to sit in Syria while expanding roles in Libya. Does Putin want to add a resisting Belarus to his portfolio?
But can Russia afford to refrain from making an effort? Even if the idea of a "color revolution" spreading to Russia is nonsense, if Putin believes that could happen that makes intervening rather important to Russia.
We'll see if Lukashenko can do well enough to prevent Putin from pulling the trigger:
With the protests now in their third week — including rallies that brought out an estimated 200,000 people in Minsk on the last two Sundays — the 65-year-old president is shifting tactics. He is moving to squelch the demonstrations gradually with vague promises of reforms mixed with threats, court summonses and the selective jailing of leading activists.
Observers say the moves by Lukashenko to buy some time likely will see him holding onto power for now, although he almost certainly will face more challenges amid a worsening economy and simmering public anger.
Buying time also buys time for Russia to invade and rescue Lukashenko. But Lukashenko can't be sure a Russian invasion would be for the purpose of rescuing Lukashenko rather than replacing him with another less hated Russian ally.
As I speculated here, this might be the place for Putin's personally loyal National Guard to get their first big job.
Or maybe Russian allies inside Belarus will succeed in a coup of some sort--likely with Russian covert support--that spares Russia the need to invade.
UPDATE: Lock and load?
Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday the Kremlin has set up a reserve police force to support Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko but it would not be used unless the unrest there got out of control, Interfax news agency reported.
But would sending in Russian police expand the anger of protesters from just Lukashenko to Russia, too?
An invasion force will take much longer to get ready, I imagine.
UPDATE: Is Belarus unrest another part of the dissolution of the USSR?
That's an interesting take. Belarusians are fairly friendly to Russia despite being independent. But is the unrest pushing the people to reject Russia? Or would Russian intervention cause that rejection and final break with Russia?
Or might Russia force the Belarusians back into the empire and damn the hearts and minds? That could be expensive.
And I've never assumed the Russian empire is done fragmenting.
