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Tuesday, July 21, 2020

The PLAN's Achilles Heel

China's fleet has expanded in technology and numbers dramatically over this century. America and our allies still should have the advantage in training and experience. Hopefully that makes up for China's fleet growth. And there is another advantage the West has.

I did not know this about the PLA Navy (PLAN):

When dealing with Chinese navy or coast guard ships foreign naval commanders have learned to take into account the dual command structure of Chinese crews. In effect Chinese warships except for smaller (less than 2,000 tons) ones have dual commanders and a naval command system that is more premeditated and slower to respond to unexpected conditions. ...

[The PLAN] political commissar is considered the equal of the regular naval commander and when it comes to a “special mission”, like deliberately harassing foreign warships or opening fire on anyone. The political commissar is the same rank as the ship captain and can overrule the ship commander at any time and in any situation. It was not always that way.

An important change took place in 2018, when naval political commissars were given equal authority with the captain as “mission commander” and is expected to replace the captain if the captain is disabled by injury or sickness. The normal second-in-command (the XO or executive officer) becomes the XO for the political commissar and the captain and third, not second, in command. The practical problem with this is that the captain and XO have spent their entire careers (fifteen or more years) learning how to run a ship and supervise the crew. In contrast the political commissar learned enough tech stuff to be more annoying. The political commissar was a professional busybody, scold and snitch. The political commissar can end the career of the captain, XO or any other officer by simply making a series of uncomplimentary reports.

I guess the reason I didn't know it is that Xi Jinping made the big change in 2018.

This is on top of the problem that plagues the Chinese navy in the best of times--China's army is the senior service and tells the navy and air force what to do. That's the extent of Chinese jointness. So we've got that going for us already.

There are other issues that work against China, too. China's shiny ships in greater numbers are truly an amazing accomplishment. But there are problems in using them. Read the whole thing. I hope our issues don't balance China's issues out.

Seriously, I don't assume we have the leadership edge--or at least not enough of an edge. somebody needs to whip the Navy into shape, starting with what is supposed to be our priority 7th Fleet in the western Pacific.

Still, from the Chinese Communist Party point of view, the political commissars make it less likely the ship commanders will do something embarrassing like defecting with their ship and crew.

The United States Navy really need to practice fighting as a fleet to exploit Chinese weaknesses.

That political commissar role will make our Navy and the fleets of allies even more effective in battle against the PLAN. One key will be to seize the initiative and make them react. The PLAN will certainly be able to start a war and do fine as long as it is following a plan that is unfolding as anticipated. But once they have to react, the dual command structure will slow their decision-making. Hopefully a fatal weakness that will be its undoing.

Thanks Xi! Now let's get to work.

UPDATE: If we want to take advantage of the Chinese flaws, in addition to fixing what caused the Bonhamme Richard fire (and learn this lesson, please), the Navy needs to get its ship in order:

A second lesson is the need to step back and look at the multi-year run of events and examine the culture of the Navy. The new secretary, former Rear Admiral Kenneth Braithwaite, rightly pledged to do so at his confirmation hearings. Culture is a complicated and difficult component of any organization — it transcends written regulations, procedures, rules and tactics. It is at heart the “this I believe” ethos of sailors

Each of the recent disasters can be explained individually, but the whole seems greater than the sum of the parts. Looking back, one hopes, the fire in the Bonhomme Richard will be seen as a turning point for the Navy — probably the starkest since the “Tailhook” sexual-assault scandals of the 1990s.

I'm worried. And I have been.