I'm on board this:
The infantry community has a problem. The centerpiece of the Army’s operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the infantry brigade combat team, is in danger of becoming obsolete in the face of near-peer opponents. This formation of three infantry battalions, an engineer battalion, an artillery battalion, a cavalry squadron, and a support battalion needs to be restructured to maximize an infantry brigade’s chances of success in an era of fast-paced and rapidly evolving multidomain operations.
The author wants a new infantry brigade with just two infantry brigades to make room for more supporting weapons and systems to fight in high-intensity combat. [I guess the new term for conventional battle is "multidomain operations." Bad TDR.]
This is all fine. Although more infantry than a two-battalion brigade has would be needed in urban warfare. And despite my firmly held view that we should minimize the need to fight in cities rather than embrace it, sometimes we will need to fight in cities because we need to and not just because we can. We could attach infantry battalions from the National Guard to the brigade tasked with urban warfare if it comes to that.
Or we'll need infantry if we need to fight COIN again despite our clear desire not to do that again. Even in the Cold War the Army had a pretty consistent even balance between infantry and heavy units.
And no, I don't think that a two-battalion brigade is radical. As the author notes, we had that organization (but with 4 companies each instead of 3) during the Iraq War during the Army expansion phase. I'll add that we know that the German army in World War II could fight effectively with two-battalion infantry regiments as long as their artillery was in the fight.
But then the author goes and ruins the ride by talking about the Army's new light tank, the Mobile Protected Firepower light tank.
This vehicle makes my left eye twitch:
The arguments for light tanks to reinforce Army infantry brigades will get our infantry brigades destroyed. ...
As I argued in my article in the April 2018 issue of Army ("Look to Abrams Tanks to Support the Infantry," pp. 42-45--sorry, not online [NOTE--yes it is]), the Army should attach tank companies or battalions (or tank-mechanized teams or task forces) to infantry brigades to give them a chance to survive a mechanized fight.
Because I don't know what obscure niche scenarios the Army has in mind for these light tank-equipped infantry brigades, but I think the most worrisome conventional land war scenario we will face is massed Russian heavy brigades storming through the Baltic states heading to link up with Russia's Kaliningrad exclave.
If we throw infantry brigades with light tanks designed to outmatch Russian light tanks into that fight, those infantry brigades will be slaughtered and likely nothing more than a speed bump.
Give our infantry brigades intended for high intensity combat the Abrams tanks and/or Bradley Fighting Vehicles they need to slug it out with Russian tanks.
I'd rather just convert more infantry brigades to armored brigades. But some infantry brigades are needed for some missions. Yet if the infantry brigades are to have a chance of surviving if thrown into the fight against heavy enemy forces, they do need more firepower and capabilities than leg infantry can bring to the field.
Drop the infantry battalions to two without reducing the battalions ATGM total, by all means. Add other supporting elements as the author offers, including reinforcing the cavalry element.
But stop mucking around the edges and just give the new infantry brigade intended for a European fight a tank battalion or a heavy task force. For God's sake, look up the old studies on Light Infantry from the Cold War when some believed they could be equipped and trained to be more than speed bumps against heavy forces.
When you start to heavy up the infantry brigade, heavy up the infantry brigade.
