But recently an entirely new formation was mentioned that could cause its own ripples across the force: a Marine littoral regiment.
“It’s looking at creating the Marine Littoral Regiment and how that’s going to resource and help make (Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations) successful,” said Maj. Gen. Mark Wise, deputy commanding general of Marine Corps Combat Development Command. ...
A retired Marine Corps officer now a senior adviser for the Center for Strategic & International Studies shared analysis at the same conference showing “no growth” for personnel in future Marine budget planning.
“Coastal defense, cyber, space,” Mark Cancian said. “They will have to take down existing capabilities to find the structure and the space to do that.”
The Marines have long been the most significant "allied" army to fight alongside the Army in expeditionary warfare. This shifts the Marines more to helping the Navy deploy, sustain, and fight.
I am on board attempts to get the Marines to adapt to A2/AD by spreading out in smaller units more useful for raids or small missions, as I wrote about in this article in the Naval Institute Proceedings (USNI membership required to access it online)--at least until naval and air dominance is achieved.
The idea of coastal defense is also an idea I'm in favor of the Navy or Marines adopting.I thought that in place of MEUs as the building block that Marine Expeditionary Companies (MECs) could be that basic unit for disaggregated operations under A2/AD threat. And some could be used for other purposes in support of expeditionary advanced base operations:
MECs also could carry out A2/AD missions. Prior to 1921, the Marines prepared “for the defense of advance bases and not for offensive landing operations.” Citing World War II experience, EF21 holds that the Marines must be capable of establishing and defending advanced bases while working with other services to “project power and control the sea.” This will allow the United States to “turn the A2/AD table” on an enemy by deploying weapons and sensors in a “network of numerous austere bases—by occupation or seizure—as a means of dispersing aircraft, missiles, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets” that deny an enemy the ability to operate in those waters and in that air space. Such advance expeditionary bases equipped with long-range strike, antiship, and antiair systems would function as “sea denial outposts.”
Such outposts—quickly established and abandoned as needed—could be used for forward arming and refueling points to support dispersed air operations ashore, making a transition between sea-based and land-based Marine air power truly seamless.
The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) also should be part of the dragon swarm concept. The NECC could create island defense forces of mixed infantry, air defense, and antiship (tube, rocket, and missile) units. Their coastal riverine force patrol boats also would contribute. Used in place of MECs, NECC coastal defense units would hold small islands and force an enemy to operate in an A2/AD environment.
So I was looking at more than just the Marines. I thought the NECC as the Navy's truly in-house ground force should have a role in these missions.
I'm assuming that creating the Marine Littoral Regiment is all about organizing these outpost forces.
NOTE: EF21 is a basic doctrine document.
