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Saturday, November 16, 2019

Missing the Point

I won't dismiss the need to compete with Russia in the political sphere. But this description of Russia's invasion of Ukraine's Crimea as an example of covert political action (see page 8 of the embedded speech) is just wrong:

The Ukraine Crisis in 2014 was an example of this [covert political action].

We saw masked Russian Special forces—the “little green men”—and Russian-backed para-military groups seize buildings and infrastructure in Crimea.

This “masked warfare” was a nod to Soviet-style disruption.

But it was also accompanied by computer attacks, manipulation of social and mass media, collapse of the national financial system, and other deceptive operations.

Together, they paralysed the Ukrainian government, and the international community.

No effective action could be taken.

It was obvious at the time that Russia was invading. The reason for the failure to react was that Ukraine was in the middle of a revolution and the new government was being formed. So nobody existed who could order the largely ineffective military into action, the military hardly new who represented legitimate authority, and nobody had recognized authority to ask for foreign help--and who could have rushed in to help?

As I've long said, Russia's new style of warfare--and calling it "hybrid warfare" doesn't make it new--is nothing terribly innovative. It is actually quite simple:

Good Lord people, Russian "hybrid warfare" is just Russian aggression that we pretend isn't happening. Sadly, there's nothing new or novel about that.

Russia invaded Ukraine. Russia denied that they invaded Ukraine. And the West went along with that fiction.

Come on people, by all means counter Russian propaganda and covert influence operations (and Chinese efforts behind a more powerful communist China). We understood this in the Cold War, after all. But let's not study Russia's subliminal invasions to death.