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Tuesday, July 23, 2019

Messy Victory, Indeed

Is American power and influence in the Middle East waning? Nope.

Since the election of Trump it has been common to claim that American power and influence are declining. But that claim is nonsense:

America still has a far greater military capacity than anyone else, and it is not close. It has alliances and relationships of a sort that no other great power can match, even as the Russians take opportunistic advantage of the situation in Syria. America's economy remains the biggest in the world, and the business ties that have grown in the Middle East over recent decades are still active, even as the Chinese expand the reach of the Belt and Road Initiative to the region. American soft power still rules the airwaves, and the best students still seek out American universities.

Yes. Just look at Iraq and Afghanistan which once attacked our friends and hosted the 9/11 attackers, respectively, and are now allies helping us fight jihadis and/or resist Iran. And Israel is now on good terms with Gulf Arab states to confront Iran. Egypt remains an American friend as does Jordan.

Syria and Hezbollah are bled white and lesser threats these days, and Hamas has lost the patronage of Arab states. Iran is finally--after policies bizarrely designed to enable Iranian power were reversed--being confronted and made to pay a price for its widespread support for violence around the Middle East.

On the other hand, Turkey under Erdogan is shaky as a NATO ally but that trend pre-dates even the Iraq War.

And Russia has a foothold in Syria now. But I'm really not worried about Russian naval and air elements in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. They would lead a short but exciting life in case of war.

On balance our position in the Middle East is fine and better than it was in 2000. Indeed, part of the false charge is that people worried about "new" problems in the region forget the actual history of unrest in their imagined Golden Age of stability.

I recently took on the claim of reduced American power and influence, and wondered if it was based purely on the world getting used to large numbers of American troops in the region as the indicator of our commitment and influence and not being able to handle the reduction of our military footprint to pre-threat levels as the military threats that required more American troops have been reduced:

So it is possible for America to reduce our combat role and rely on local allies and on our proven ability to rapidly deploy forces if they are needed. The problem is that in the visuals the world has gotten used to seeing a lot of American forces in combat as a concrete demonstration of our commitment.

But a reduction in our military power doesn't mean our commitment is lower. It means the need for our military power in the region to back our commitment is going down after spiking from about 1973 to 2009 (although the surges in Afghanistan extended that to 2011 or so). Eventually locals will get used to our lower footprint and lower level of direct combat without thinking it means less commitment.

Indeed, it may be that our role will shift from policing the Middle East to reduce threats coming out of the area to shielding the region against threats from the outside. As it once was when we worried about the Soviet Union and President Carter established the forerunner of modern CENTCOM, the Rapid Deployment Force.

American power and influence in the Middle East has not collapsed. But our past exertions have reduced the need for a large ground footprint. That's a good thing.