How can mistakes like the new electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) which replaces steam catapults still be a problem?
During sea trials the Ford used EMALS heavily, as would be the case in combat and training operations and found EMALS less reliable than the older steam catapult. EMALS was also more labor intensive to operate, put more stress on launched aircraft than expected. Worse, due to a basic design flaw if one EMALS catapult becomes inoperable, the other three catapults could not be used in the meantime as was the case with steam catapults.
Without working EMALS, we have very large helicopter carriers building. Not to be too pessimistic, but thank goodness the Marines have F-35Bs that don't require catapults.
I keep hoping this is just a normal--if at the extreme edge of it--teething problem for a new system.
But in case it isn't just the usual problem, this problem is the reason Truman isn't being retired early before its midlife refit. This ship buys time to figure out what is wrong with Ford.
But this problem following on the problems of the Zumwalt class destroyer and the Littoral Combat Ship program makes me worry that this isn't just a normal problem--although it may the new normal of incompetence hitting our naval shipbuilding industry.
Which is wonderful timing just as the Chinese fleet is poised to be a real threat to our control of the seas.
Still, maybe there is a silver lining. Maybe the problems with Ford will force the Navy to come to grips with the question of whether the carrier should be the capital ship of our fleet and the center of our sea control efforts. As I wrote in 2000 when Ford was still far in the future, in an article accepted for publication but not published, network-centric warfare signals the end of the sea control mission for aircraft carriers:
Adopting and implementing the naval application of the RMA, network-centric warfare (NCW), is a "fundamental shift from what we call platform-centric warfare[.]" Both the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and National Defense Panel (NDP) final report of 1997 endorsed NCW as the proper path for the Navy. Victory in warfare dominated by networks will in large measure depend on making strategic choices that fit with the new and changing system. After over forty years of optimizing our naval forces to fight the Soviets in a global war, taking a fresh look at the Navy is a daunting task.
The question of whether large aircraft carriers deserve to be the center of our future naval strategy is a fundamental question that has not been adequately explored. Network-centric warfare signals the beginning of the end for the United States Navy's large aircraft carriers. They will lose their value as an instrument of forward presence and become valuable targets that, if struck, will encourage an enemy at the outset of war by apparently demonstrating that American technological prowess can be nullified and beaten. In the long run, large aircraft carriers will add little to most offensive missions and will absorb scarce resources and assets simply evading attack rather than striking the enemy and contributing to victory.
Thank God we apparently don't have a problem with the new Virginia class SSN we are still building. Something new needs to hold the line.
