And America responded effectively:
One known result of all this unexpected intel on new Russian EW gear was the news that the U.S. Army was able to develop and, in 2018, deploy to the troops a new EW system to detect and deal with new Russian EW weapons encountered in Ukraine and Syria over the last few years. The army, continuing to use the rapid development and deployment methods implemented after 2001 (and now called the Rapid Capabilities Office), developed new hardware and software to detect, analyze and cope (to a certain extent) with a lot of the new EW capabilities Russia had put to work in Ukraine and Syria. None of the recent Russian EW gear was radically new stuff, but further developments of systems they had built during the Cold War. What was unusual was the speed with which the U.S. military was able to respond. This was largely because it was [now] clear that the Russians had, for a long time, developed EW capabilities that the West underestimated.
Ukraine was very helpful in this effort, as were new NATO allies who used to be in the Warsaw Pact.
It is always a difficult call on whether to use capabilities to win the war you are in or save it for a more important war.
Did Russia make a mistake revealing their EW capabilities in a war they haven't won? Or have the Russians saved their best EW capabilities for a war with NATO or China?
