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Wednesday, September 05, 2018

Are the Israelis Taking Pride in How Fast They Can Screw the Pooch?

Israel once had the best army in the Middle East. Now Israel apparently wants two aerial services that want to fight their own war while leaving the army to fend for itself. Could that possibly be true?

Missiles are useful and surely an alternative to manned aircraft for some missions. But good grief, a separate missile corps?

The Israel Defense Forces invests the better part of its funds, its energies and its qualitative human resources in the air force, and has become the first foreign army to have tested the United States' F-35 stealth fighter jets under real combat conditions.

The missions and sorties the Israeli air force had accomplished in two weeks of fighting in the Second Lebanon War can now be carried out in a 24-hour timeframe. The air force is viewed as Israel’s awe-inspiring strategic arm and its most effective instrument of deterrence.

Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman is now working to add a new dimension. At this stage, Israel has no intentions of adversely affecting the quality and dominance of its air force, but Liberman has already set his sights on a strategy that he wants to promote in his current term of office: The establishment of a “missile corps” in the IDF, a “smart” missile-rocket military arm that will be precise and deadly over various ranges, from southern Lebanon to the depths of Syria. It would be Israel’s counterbalance to Hezbollah’s seemingly infinite rocket arsenal and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s renewed missile capabilities.

Ah yes, Israel considers it great progress to be able to screw the pooch in 24 hours when once it took two weeks during the 2006 war with Hezbollah. And the defense chief wants to what? Cut it to 12 hours? Have two services contribute to the 24-hour objective?

I was horrified that the Israelis were aiming to destroy in 24 hours what they had previously taken three days to destroy, rather than figuring out how to occupy the rocket- and missile-launching sites with their own troops as rapidly as possible--with the air and missile support needed to do it quickly.

And it is horrifying that the Israelis may think that punishing the rest of Lebanon for what the Iranian-backed Hezbollah does outside of weak central government authority isn't counter-productive. How did that work out in 2006, anyway?

Worse than morally wrong, it's a mistake. Israel should focus on smashing up Hezbollah--which I'm starting to think might not happen--and try to get the Lebanese government to take control of Hezbollah-occupied Lebanon in the aftermath.

Although some part of me says that given that Assad of Syria, Russia, and Israel all want to reduce Iran's influence in Syria for their own reasons that Assad and Russia might look the other way after Idlib province is reconquered if Israel wants to smash Iran's bridgehead in Lebanon, thus weakening Iran in the region.

So maybe this talk of a missile corps and speed of destruction is misdirection to make Hezbollah think they are safe in their southern Lebanon stronghold and simply have to endure Israeli bombardment while Hezbollah unleashes its rocket arsenal on Israeli civilian targets.

If that is so and Israel plans to drive deep into Lebanon to really rip apart Hezbollah (and I have read other articles that indicate to me that the Israelis aren't in thrall to air power), bravo--you certainly have me fooled into thinking Israel is being stupid.