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Saturday, August 25, 2018

Neat--But is the Mission Being Overlooked?

During the Iraq War a lot of friendly casualties--both uniformed and contractors--happened on the roads during supply convoy movements. We continue to adapt to that problem.

We ended just-in-time supply and re-established reserves of supplies to endure short breaks in supply runs; we used aircraft to replace (1%) of truck convoys, we built MRAPs, we diligently cleared routes of IEDs, used predictive software, and we used contractors to reduce military casualties. We won the battle of the convoys, inflicting heavy casualties on the attackers and keeping the supplies moving. It  was a unique feature of the war.

And now we will have automated convoys for the next war:

After a decade and a half of development, the Army has decided to forgo normal acquisition procedures and field leader-follower robotic truck convoys by 2019, a service official said Aug. 22.

The Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center will begin outfitting 50 to 70 Palletized Load System trucks with autonomy kits by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2019, Jeffery Ernat, the center’s team leader for autonomy teaming, said at the National Defense Industrial Association’s Army Science and Technology Symposium in Washington, D.C.

The trucks will be split between two Army companies and be used in operational field tests in the United States, he said. Leader-follower concepts usually have one manned vehicle in front of the convoy with the rest of the trucks following autonomously without drivers.

Of course, while limiting exposure to casualties, the leader-follower concept makes it easier to stop the supplies by disabling the leader truck. Do that and everything following stops, too.*

Which seems kind of odd when you remember that the mission is to deliver supplies to the combat troops and bases. The mission is not to avoid casualties. We surely want to minimize casualties, but that should be in the context of carrying out the mission. Did the Army forget that?

Also, it seems to me that remote weapon stations manned by troops on secure bases--in a version of my (somewhat) recent proposal in Infantry magazine--could be used to defend the convoys.

*And I'd be remiss if I didn't note the time I was driving a truck in convoy out to Fort Custer and somehow--I know not how--all the other vehicles ahead of me disappeared as we entered the camp (perhaps they had important officer stuff to do) leaving me the lead vehicle going into Custer. There was nobody to guide me, neither I nor my co-driver knew where we were supposed to go, and it was dark. So at one point I decided to pull off the left side of the road to figure out where we were supposed to go. Surely an officer or NCO would know.

To my amazement, the convoy efficiently and neatly lined up to my left and behind me in the field that I didn't know was there in the dark, in a truly neat truck park in the minutes that followed. In daylight it would look rather impressive. As I became aware that every vehicle crew was shutting down and leaving their trucks, I turned mine off, too.

I do know that the plan was to deploy into the field with our vehicles and then return to the barracks for the night so we could start training early. But with troops scattered, that plan failed right off the bat. And all that because the leader had no instructions on where to go and the followers followed unaware that the leader had no guidance.

Murphy's Law is scary to see. Even with no lethal consequences.

Nobody ever asked me if I knew what happened that night and I sure didn't volunteer an explanation.