But this part of the article bears repeating, because I've noted this again and again in various contexts:
Only snake-oil salesmen would prophesy with confidence that a fraction of one armed force—even a stronger one—will vanquish the whole of a near-peer force. It’s even more doubtful when the battle takes place on the latter’s home ground. After all, the pugilist protecting its turf lies close to scenes of action, knows the physical and cultural terrain better than any outsider can, and has the option of hurling the bulk of its forces into the fray to overpower antagonists fighting far from home.
America remains stronger than any single foe. It is possible that we have more power than any combination of foes. That doesn't speak to how they would be used and what forces would be available on day 400 of a war, but on day 1 America is stronger.
But not at the point of impact if an enemy seizes the initiative.
Because in a China scenario, America will be on the defensive. We have no disruptive goals and like the status quo. If war comes, China will start it.
And in that case, China will be able to maximize their combat power to take on the small portion of America's global combat power deployed in the western Pacific.
Worse for us, by initiating combat, China can maximize the readiness of their forces while ours will have the usual amounts out of action for maintenance or whatnot.
Further, China could time the attack to coincide with the unavailability of key combat capabilities from deployment elsewhere or rotation gaps or any other situation that takes American systems out of the mix for a short time.
Which is why I really don't like forward deploying key assets where they can be destroyed in the opening hours and days of a war. I'd be much more comfortable exposing only expendable assets in smaller numbers to any attack, representing a tripwire only. Not only does that reduce our losses until we can gather our superior forces, it reduces the temptation to our potential enemies to strike first by dangling key assets in range.
Of course, when discussing a US-China war over Taiwan, keep in mind that China doesn't have to defeat America to win the war.
All China has to do is delay American decisive intervention long enough to invade and conquer Taiwan:
[The] Chinese want to keep this a localized conflict so they won't open with a Pearl Harbor-style attack on our forces at Guam, Okinawa, or any other US bases in Japan. They may not even be capable of seriously hitting bases successfully so far away. An ineffective attack would be counter-productive. Why bother emphasizing the internal nature of the conflict if you are going to internationalize the crisis by attacking other nations? When the war needs to be won quickly before the US and Japan intervene, why make it easier for America and Japan to intervene by essentially deciding for us? Why give the UN cause to get involved? Absent direct inter-state conflict, our response could be delayed critical days or weeks.
So the plan will be a direct and fast assault on Taiwan to win before any outside power can save Taiwan from conquest. The Chinese will have four main missions for their military in an invasion: One, landing nine army divisions and one Marine division on Taiwanese territory plus dropping three parachute divisions and one air landing division. Two, securing the sea and air lines of supply and reinforcement from China to Taiwan. Three, keeping American forces away from Taiwan long enough to finish the conquest. This will also include non-military measures. Fourth, the Chinese must defeat the Taiwanese army and conquer the island.
Since I wrote that 13 years ago, the Chinese are building the ability to hit our distant bases in the Pacific. But the basic logic holds true. America and our allies need time to intervene decisively and Taiwan must buy that time to make sure there is somebody to rescue.
And the author of that first article knows this far better than I can appreciate, I'm sure:
If Chinese warplanes, missiles, surface craft, and submarines can engage U.S. naval forces at long range, they can help absorb the shock from the American offensive—and, if successful, slow it to a halt before it reaches the combat zone. At a minimum A2/AD will grant PLA forces time to subdue the island’s defenders.
Taipei must give U.S. rescuers that time back, and it must help keep American losses down, and fighting strength up. Missile-armed ROC Navy patrol craft can work in concert with shore-based rocketeers to mount a delaying action in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese air and sea forces can fan out to the island’s east, helping open a corridor for U.S. reinforcements to steam into the theater. They can keep China from winning quickly—and give the U.S. Navy time to puncture China’s offshore crumple zone.
Once China achieves that objective, apart from a long-term plan to mass 4 American Marine divisions to liberate Taiwan, the only point of American combat missions is to bomb and destroy sensitive equipment America sold to Taiwan to avoid it falling into Chinese hands for reverse engineering.
The author brings up the concept of tripwires to convey American resolve and increase the risk to China of starting a wider war than one just over Taiwan. He doesn't offer specifics. Does he anticipate a tripwire on land or in the Taiwan Strait?
