Cities--and huge "mega-citie"s in particular--are a new rage in combat theory.
I'm not fully on board the rush to enter cities. The long and bloody combat for Mosul should be a cautionary tale about what we'll experience as much as it is a call to do it better.
So with caveats, this is fine:
The U.S. military, specifically the Army and Marines, have adopted new procedures within which to fight an “urban” war, where up to 70 percent of the world’s population will live in as little as a couple of decades, explains a new report in Joseph Farah’s G2 Bulletin.
As long as this caution is heeded:
“[American military commanders] consider the location and intent of the threat force; critical infrastructure or capabilities that are operationally or strategically valuable; the geographic location of an urban area; and the area’s political, economic, or cultural significance.”
The guidelines explained, “Humanitarian concerns require control of an urban area or necessitate operations within it. Commanders conduct urban operations because they provide a tactical, political, or economic advantage, or not doing so threatens the larger campaign.”
If we need to take a city for specific reasons to win, we should be able to do it. Of course.
I just don't want the Army and Marines sucked into a city as a matter of routine. "Never fight a land war in mega-cities" should be a saying that inculcates caution.
And this is nice to read:
“Army/Marine Corps forces achieve offensive surprise at the operational and tactical levels. In urban offensive operations, operational surprise is decisive. The goal is to attack the urban area before the enemy expects it, from an unexpected direction, or in an unexpected manner.
I was certainly eager to "bounce" Baghdad on the run in 2003 rather than give Saddam's forces time to prepare to endure a siege. That "thunder run" worked well.
This also at least provides a good reason that I kept waiting to see an air mobile assault into ISIL-held Mosul during the offensive begun in 2016 that would seize a stadium for use as an airhead to find a way around a long frontal assault through the maze of west Mosul. That never happened, of course. But it does make sense in theory.
Anyway, this is a battlefield the Army (and Marines) may need to fight in. Indeed, I've long figured the Marines should take the lead in urban warfare (see my article beginning on page 38) as a dry feet variation of assaulting defended shores from the sea. And the Army should be able to help, if needed.
I just don't want to destroy the Army that is America's main mobile warfare force in order to needlessly save the city.
