The Iranian-sponsored November 4 ballistic missile attack on Saudi Arabia's capital, Riyadh, continues to roil the Middle East -- and it should.
Well, yes.
And the Iranian Yemen proxy launching an Iranian missile at Saudi Arabia's capital Riyadh where civilians would have died if not shot down is a clear argument that Saudi Arabia can make in defense of an Israeli attack on Hezbollah--Iran's proxy in Lebanon--which poses a rocket threat to Israeli civilians.
And note that Saudi pressure on Fatah, which rules the West Bank and has a new toe hold in Gaza, to cut a peace deal with Israel would deny Hezbollah their Palestinian allies in a war with Israel.
In related news, Iran probably sent a message to Saudi Arabia by bombing a pipeline in Bahrain, which is close to being a Saudi protectorate that guarantees that the minority Sunnis run the Shia-majority island state.
Look what we can do so close to you (and maybe we can do it even closer), is the message.
Let's see if the message received is that Saudi Arabia had best win this brewing proxy war with Iran.
UPDATE: Cooperation against Iran doesn't mean there will be a joint military campaign (although it could if cooperation extends to actively disarming Iran of nuclear weapons). But intelligence sharing and diplomatic support for each other's military actions would be very helpful to each.
And if Israel hits Hezbollah in Lebanon, it is definitely not fighting for Saudi Arabia, as this author asserts:
Israeli generals in particular are suspicious of the Saudis’ military capabilities. “They have money, but they don’t have actual significant hard power,” said one senior military official. “They were only willing to fight in the periphery of the campaign against [the Islamic State] and have failed miserably in the Yemen war. It’s amazing for us to see how slowly they’ve adapted to dealing with guerilla warfare.”
Since Salman’s series of surprise moves, some analysts have suggested that the Saudis, with the Israeli government’s consent, are intentionally pushing Israel and Hezbollah to another military confrontation. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah was quick to pick up on the notion of a secret Zionist-Wahhabi conspiracy to destroy Lebanon in his speech last Friday, but the idea that Israel is colluding in Saudi’s recent moves remains far-fetched. It is true that both Saudi Arabia and Israel are now on the same side when it comes to blocking Iranian influence; some Israeli analysts even joke that Israel has unofficially become a moderate Sunni state. But there is still a long way from shared interests to an Israeli prime minister agreeing to risk soldiers’ lives in a war about which little could be definitively said beyond that it would result in Saudi political gains.
The Saudis have largely launched an air campaign in Yemen and it has been very successful, and did prevent a Houthi victory. The problem is in herding Yemen Sunni factions into a credible offensive threat to defeat the Houthi Shias backed by Iran.
As for Israel fighting in Lebanon for Saudi Arabia, that is a ridiculous charge. So ridiculous that I suspect it might be propagated to deflect attention from the real possibility that Israel will strike Hezbollah soon.
Saying Israel didn't intervene in Syria before and so proves Israel has no interest in stopping Iran in Lebanon misses the point that Israel had no reason to interrupt the circular firing squad that bled Hezbollah, jihadis, and Assad--as well as costing Iran money.
Why intervene and risk the parties shooting at each other responding by agreeing to kill Jews, who they can at least all agree on hating?
Once Hezbollah's role in Syria ends, thus ending maximum self-damage, then Israel could hammer Hezbollah in a massive raid deep into Lebanon. Israel would then withdraw, hopefully with the Lebanese national army and a in-theory better UN force in southern Lebanon preventing Hezbollah from reestablishing their sub-state autonomy and rocket launching arsenal there.
Remember, in 2006 Israel flailed against Hezbollah in that war, with air strikes failing to shut down the rocket launches, failing to pressure the weak Lebanese government from doing what it couldn't do (shutting down Hezbollah), and failing with a belated, half-hearted, and inept ground operation to push Hezbollah far enough from the border to protect Israeli civilians from rocket attack.
Israel could use Saudi diplomatic support to gain the time to hammer Hezbollah, which would hurt Iran; while Saudi Arabia could use Israeli intelligence help to defeat Iran in Yemen.
