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Tuesday, November 28, 2017

Good Freaking God, Why?

You don't take a knife to a gun fight and you shouldn't take a light tank to a mechanized fight.

This is really disturbing to me:

The Army’s effort to bring a Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) capability to infantry brigade combat teams -- a near-term priority laid out in the service’s combat vehicle modernization strategy -- has officially kicked off with the release of a request for proposals on Nov. 21.

Why is it a priority to equip our infantry brigades with a light tank when a brigade equipped with such inadequately protected and armed vehicles will just be a slightly higher speed bump when hit by a Russian motor rifle regiment?

Seriously, this is the mission?

The requirement for MPF is to provide infantry brigade combat teams a protected, long-range, cyber resilient, precision, direct-fire capability for early or forcible entry operations.

In what world are Army infantry brigades the early or forcible entry force when we have the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Airmobile Division, and the entire Marine Corps for that role?

We're really going to lead an offensive with infantry brigades while heavy brigades are still struggling to reach the area of operations by sea?

Light tanks have a niche role in airmobile or airborne brigades, but if we want to help our infantry survive contact with a heavy enemy force, just equip the brigades with Abrams main battle tanks--we have lots in our stockpiles, remember.

Put a bunch of Abrams-heavy combined arms company-sized teams on prepositioned ships near the theater (or ashore in sets) for the purpose of augmenting each infantry brigade sent overseas--or each battalion within the brigade if the enemy armor threat is high.

Don't take a light tank to a main battle tank fight.