Rationally speaking, North Korea couldn't possibly launch a nuclear strike. Therefore, it was critical for North Korea to appear irrational. Only apparent irrationality, meticulously managed, could convince the Americans, the South Koreans, the Japanese, the Russians, and the Chinese that North Korea was utterly dangerous.
This is what I've been saying. North Korea hasn't risked war since the Korean War ceasefire despite periodic attacks on South Korea (mostly) and America to inflict casualties and keep their street cred.
Although North Korea was very hostile and violent well before losing the USSR and China as major arms suppliers. I disagree with the idea that those two kept North Korea weak. North Korea before 1991 had a decent military relative to South Korea--especially considering the geography as Friedman notes--even if the north's GDP was too low to sustain it without foreign help.
But the key issue is rationality. North Korea is rational within their framework and not inviting a nuclear strike on North Korea is one of them. They probably even know that America and South Korea do not covet that black hole of poverty that they mis-rule.
This is why as a bilateral issue, I've long been ready to accept a policy of deterrence if North Korea goes nuclear.
But what makes me extremely uneasy about that course of action is the proliferation angle. If North Korea sells nukes or the technology and manufacturing skills to Iran, we could easily have an enemy who can't be deterred with any confidence.
Seriously, even if the mullahs in charge are rational enough not to use nukes, are you sure you want to count on all the nutballs beneath them in the various Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) groups not getting their hands on nukes and then using even one?
What would get this back to a bilateral issue? Either the placement of all things nuclear in North Korea in Chinese hands--with dual key control of nuclear weapons launch protocols and total Chinese control of nuclear technology and infrastructure to make China responsible for any proliferation from North Korea; or the elimination of the mullah regime in Iran to deprive North Korea of their most likely nutball customer.
Do either (preferably both) and I think deterring North Korea could be an acceptable strategy given the risks and price of going to war with North Korea.
UPDATE: Although on the keeping North Korea weak issue, it is true that North Korea requires foreign support to sustain that army in combat for very long.
