There was a time when America's power superiority over China was so great that our allies without a major land corridor to China could safely rely on our power to hold off China.
We sometimes resented that without appreciating the fact that it meant we were so superior that our allies could afford to slack off.
Today, China's rising power and worries about our ability to defend them are pushing our allies (and creating new allies) to arm up and work together.
Vietnam and the Philippines are a case in point:
The Philippine navy will soon return to a South China Sea island it lost to Vietnam 40 years ago to drink beer and play volleyball with Vietnamese sailors, symbolising how once-suspicious neighbours are cooperating in the face of China's assertiveness in disputed waters.
Diplomats and experts describe the nascent partnership as part of a web of evolving relationships across Asia that are being driven by fear of China as well as doubts among some, especially in Japan, over the U.S. commitment to the region. ...
Among the new network of ties: growing cooperation between Japan and India; Vietnam courting India and Russia; and Manila and Hanoi, the two capitals most feeling China's wrath over claims to the potentially energy-rich South China Sea, working more closely together. The Philippines and Vietnam are also talking to Malaysia about China.
On the surface, this is good. And it is. To a point.
The point it stops being good is if the power balance tilts too much to China and these states take the next step and either build their own nukes to deter China or decide that prudence requires them to make deals with China and switch sides or go neutral.
Yes, these states can increase cooperation with each other. But they all ultimately require American power to hold China at bay:
But for all those neighbors to be willing to stand up to China's power, they have to be confident that we have the power and determination to use it against China and to be confident that other potential partners won't stop absorbing some of China's power by making deals with China to ally with Peking. If these countries don't have confidence that we will help them, they'll cut a deal with China to protect themselves and turn away from us.
So we have to be careful about maintaining our power in the Pacific and maintaining our reputation for supporting allies and fighting until we win. If any nation, like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Australia, or Vietnam think that they can't count on us for effective military support, they'll withdraw from the potential balancing coalition against China. And once one country defects, the power potential arrayed against China will drop enough to perhaps push another country to defect and align with China rather than with us.
Thus, even a reduction in our military power that may seem marginal to us could be what tips the system against us in a cascade of defections, causing a dramatic drop in coalition power arrayed against China, and denying us the capability of operating in the western Pacific. Instead of being a rear base to support our allies against China, Guam would become an outpost as we are pushed back to the Aleutians-Hawaii line for our line of defense against Chinese naval power.
All these bilateral relationships in local areas require American power to knit them together in ways that hold China at bay. Without our power spanning the entire region, each portion of the growing partnership of nations opposed to China is vulnerable to China--on interior lines--deciding to mass forces against one portion of that partnership and overwhelm it without having to worry about other local points of opposition being able to intervene against China.
In this manner, China can pick off enemies and compel others to wonder where they are on the list--and either go nuclear or switch sides.
Stratfor has relevant thoughts on our defense issues. There is so much to comment on that I'll simply say check it out. I have few quibbles with this analysis. While I'm a ground power guy, his thoughts explain my affection for a powerful Navy and my appreciation for a dominant Air Force to support the Army.
So we're at the end of the "end of history." Nor really, of course. History didn't end. We just pretended it did. At least the lesson was learned in Crimea and not someplace that could decisively harm our security directly.
