The Obvious Solution that May Not Work

Yes, a blockade of China is the obvious approach to defeating China in a war.

This leverages our naval power against China's reliance on sea lines of communication and lack of a blue water navy to protect that trade from China's ports to overseas ports around the globe.

A blockade can take place well away from China's land-based anti-ship weapons and away from much of China's navy that can't operate away from shore-based air defense umbrellas.

But if the war isn't just a US-China clash, and instead involves a fight with US allies in the shadow of China's power--such as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, or the Philippines--we will have no choice but to get close to China (with more than subs, mines, and long-range strikes for a "close" blockade to support a "distant" blockade) and fight for access to our allies in order to help them defend themselves.

In those circumstances, a blockade strategy can only complement our approach to China to directly fight the Chinese. Otherwise, we'd just be abandoning our allies to hope we can starve China into giving back whatever they take while we stand off far from shore.

And if China can get enough trade and resources through alternate inland routes, we might not be able to pressure China enough to get them to give up what is (or will become) a "core" interest.

Let's not even contemplate how China might think of a really effective blockade that lasts long enough to lead to industrial shut downs and hunger. They have nuclear weapons, you know.

So yeah, we'd need to blockade China in a war. But there is no way that we can be sure it will be enough to win.

Unfortunately, The National Interest mostly seems interested in exploring ways to define retreating from global commitments as better strategy. Perhaps I'm being unfair, but that's how their work usually reads to me.