The death of a brigadier general (Mohammad Jamali-Paqaleh) apparently in Iran's Quds force--the terrorist-supporting arm of the Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran)--may indicate how much Iran is in charge of Assad's forces:
It's unlikely Iran has any sizeable force in Syria that are actually engaging in combat. For now, the emphasis is on directing Assad's war because his demoralized generals seem incapable of finding a winning strategy, and to ensure that Iran maintains a strategic gateway to the Levant in Syria.
With foreigners of Hezbollah and Iran's Shia Foreign Legion spearheading assaults by Assad's demoralized and hollowed out infantry, Syria's army seems capable only of support functions like artillery, tank, and air support.
One thing that is odd is the article's description of the al Quds commander who is in charge of Iran's intervention in Syria:
The much-anticipated offensive is likely to be a prolonged operation that will, in large part because of the mountainous terrain, involve counter-insurgency warfare more than big battalions of tanks and mechanized troops.
This is the kind of combat in which Suleimani, 56, and the Quds Force excel, along with several thousand Hezbollah fighters and hardened Shiite veterans from Iraq as well as other Shiites reportedly recruited from Lebanon, Yemen and the Persian Gulf States.
This in reference to a looming offensive toward terrain northwest of Damascus into mountains that are adjacent to Lebanon.
I'm puzzled by the description of the Quds Force as a counter-insurgency force. Perhaps the force can be described as skilled in insurgency after their support for insurgents and terrorists in Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan (and terror in general worldwide). But in what world are they skilled in counter-insurgency?
Oh, sure, they had some experience early in the Iran-Iraq War in suppressing Kurdish rebels in northwest Iran, but that wasn't much of a campaign and it was some time ago.
Is Iran likely to have the skill set to wage the war effectively?
You'd think our efforts to support non-jihadi rebels could exploit the information war angle of the foreign nature of both the jihadi rebels and the Iranians leading the Assad war.
