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Wednesday, October 09, 2013

Tiny Wars

The Philippines is preparing to contest China for control of the small islands of the South China Sea. This can have a big effect.

The Philippines is building a base at Oyster Bay, closer to the South China Sea, for US and Filipino forces:

The new naval base will be located on Oyster Bay, “a postcard-perfect cove on Palawan Island,” according to Reuters. Oyster Bay is 550 km (340 miles) southwest of Manila, the Filipino capitol city, and just 160 km (100 miles) from the Spratly Islands, a fiercely contested area in the South China Sea. ...

Oyster Bay, located on the western side of the Philippines closer to the South China Sea, is likely to be one of those places [where US forces have access to Filipino bases]. Philippine President Benigno Aquino has approved initial funds of nearly US$11.6 million to construct the new base, which is expected to be ready by the time he leaves office in 2016. ...

The Inquirer said that the Philippines was installing various radar outposts around the base to allow the military to better monitor events in the South China Sea. ...

Once completed, the base should hold “at least four large naval vessels,” Peña told The Inquirer. ...

“The plan is to station 50 to 60 American marines in Palawan as an advance command post in the region,” the official told Kyodo.

The report went on to say: “The officer said the 1.1 kilometer airstrip inside the reservation will be extended to 2.4 km to accommodate big U.S. military transport planes.”

The Philippines is far smaller than China, and if China makes even a small effort they can pound the Philippines unless Manila gets outside help. But in tiny wars over tiny islands, the Philippines can compete with China. And by competing in tiny wars, Manila compels China to risk war with outside powers (mainly America and Japan, but possibly South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, and Australia, too) by making an effort big enough to beat down the Philippines.

China would also have to risk operating above a certain pain threshold that can't be ignored because American forces will be well positioned to compete with tiny Chinese military efforts to settle island disputes by force. US Marines will be stationed in Okinawa and Guam in regimental size with a battalion in northwest Australia (rotating through rather than being permanently stationed there), with more in Hawaii and California able to quickly move forward to places like Oyster Bay that can serve as a launching pad for operations in the South China Sea.

In tiny wars, our quality will give us the edge.

Remember, our objectives in the South China Sea (and East China Sea, for that matter) are pretty clear. We don't actually care who owns the islands as long as two factors are maintained: 1) that the disputes are settled peacefully by the contesting states, and 2) that the South China Sea remains international waters under traditional legal grounds.

Of course, the problem is that China has slowly, over the decades, pushed direct action to take and hold these islands. And China claims pretty much the whole region under unique interpretation of the Law of the Sea and by asserting ancient Chinese traditional treatment of the sea.

So the ability of even the tiny military of the Philippines to fight tiny wars with China can have a big effect. If China doesn't have confidence that they can keep winning these tiny wars, China will have to either compete in tiny wars that they can lose or make a choice between negotiating or expanding the wars to levels that risk triggering a general war over some damn fool thing in the South China Sea.

UPDATE: So far, China rejects negotiations:

Any substantive progress in resolving the dispute is unlikely at the East Asia Summit beginning in Brunei on Wednesday and tensions between China and other claimants to the oil- and gas-rich sea will likely linger, analysts, senior regional officials and diplomats said.

The conflicting claims over the South China Sea, stretching deep into Southeast Asia, has pit an increasingly assertive Beijing against smaller Asian nations that look to support from the United States. The row is one of the region's biggest flashpoints amid China's military build-up and the U.S. strategic "pivot" back to Asia.

Washington says it is officially neutral but has put pressure on Beijing and other claimants to end the dispute through talks. It insists all parties refrain from force and do nothing to impede sea lanes that carry half the world's shipping.

But we need to keep these avenues open for negotiations as a viable alternative to China simply resorting to a big or even medium war.

Yes, China says they want to negotiate. But their vision is one where China talks one-on-one with isolated and weak nations who don't have America for support and who seek to cut the least-bad deal at the expense of other isolated and weak nations. This approach does not meet our conditions for voluntary agreements and freedom of navigation.

UPDATE: China says it would prefer America, Japan, and Australia to stay out of South China Sea disputes so China has more freedom to bully their small neighbors into submission:

China said on Monday the United States, Australia and Japan should not use their alliance as an excuse to intervene in territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, and urged them to refrain from inflaming regional tensions.

Because if we stayed out, small neighbors would quietly submit and not inflame tensions by resisting Chinese aggression.

But we're not staying out:

Indeed, ahead of President Barack Obama's originally planned visit to Manila in October 2013, both countries were working on a new security accord, called the Increased Rotational Presence (IRP) Agreement. Once in effect, it would allow American forces to more regularly rotate through the island country for joint U.S.-Philippine military exercises, focusing on maritime security, maritime domain awareness, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The new agreement would also allow the United States to preposition the combat equipment used by its forces at Philippine military bases. That, in turn, would save the time and fuel needed to fly in such equipment and keep it close at hand in case of a crisis. Eventually, the frequency of U.S.-Philippine exercises could increase to the point where there would be a near-continuous American military presence in the Philippines.

Nobody but China wants it quiet--if the price for that is just giving China what it wants.

UPDATE: More support:

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry gave tacit backing to the Philippines' stance in a tense maritime dispute with China on Thursday, saying that all countries had a right to seek arbitration to resolve competing territorial claims.

The Philippines, a U.S. ally, has angered China by launching an arbitration case with the United Nations to challenge the legal validity of Beijing's sweeping claims over the resource-rich South China Sea.

Making China publicly look like the bad guy in this is a good idea, I thought.