This is a fine article on the lessons we've forgotten from the "Black Hawk Down" battle:
On October 3, 1993, 160 U.S. Army Rangers and other special operations forces launched what was supposed to be a routine raid to capture two lieutenants of Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed. But when two MH-60L helicopters providing fire support were shot down, the operation became a desperate search and rescue mission in which U.S. forces were besieged overnight by thousands of heavily armed Somali militiamen. Fourteen hours after the operation’s start, eighteen Americans were dead, 84 were wounded, and one pilot was missing.
We got out of that ambush--with the high value targets we went in to capture. And the enemy suffered enormous losses.
The author addresses the issue that technology does not guarantee superiority in every situation; that human terrain intelligence is important in campaigns like Somalia where we hunted warlords (I noted this issue recently, in fact); that hits to our reputation reduce our capacity to act and encourage enemies--including Osama bin Laden; and that the perfect plan that is impossible shouldn't prevent us from resolutely pursuing a good--or even adequate--plan (indeed, I noted that here in an update to a non-defense post).
But I want to address one in particular, the need for persistence in fighting war and the related issue that we often assume the enemy can endure more than we can.
In the aftermath of the battle, we began to retreat from Somalia. And whether or not we should have been there (I did not think it was worth committing our troops to a humanitarian mission that I felt--so soon after Desert Storm--was basically to prove we'd intervene in a Moslem country that doesn't have oil. I told my then-wife that given time, Somalis would be shooting at us.), our decision to be defeated saved our enemies:
Tactically and operationally, the Battle of Mogadishu was a victory for Task Force Ranger, which had raided into the heart of the adversary’s stronghold in broad daylight and seized 24 prisoners, including the two HVTs they were after. Although the cost was steep, the Somalis had fared much worse, suffering an estimated 500-1,000 fatalities. Many families aligned with Aideed had suffered casualties, and local spies reported some of Aideed’s strongest clan allies had fled Mogadishu fearing the seemingly inevitable American retribution. Others were sending peace feelers, offering to dump Aideed to avoid further bloodshed. Both General Garrison and UN envoy Jonathan Howe believed Aideed had been struck a mortal blow and pressed their respective superiors to finish the campaign.
But back home, the perception in Washington was shaped by the horrifying television images of dead and naked bodies of U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. President Clinton asked his staff, “How could this happen?” and many in Congress demanded an immediate withdrawal from Somalia. Ignoring Garrison and Howe’s recommendation, on October 7 Clinton threw in the towel and announced all U.S. forces would be withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994. As UNOSOM II’s Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Major General Thomas Montgomery recalled, “We wound up . . . giving a victory to Aideed that Aideed did not win on the third day of October.”
I wrote a few years after that battle, in an article published in Army magazine, that the Battle of Mogadishu should be remembered as a victory against tremendous odds by resolute forces who would not give up. Two Medals of Honor were awarded (postuhumously) for actions in that battle, remember.
And twenty years later, it is still stunning that our loss of fewer than 20 troops was viewed by our leadership as a more grievous wound than the loss of 500-1,000 dead enemy fighters. And you wonder why enemies assume that inflicting any casualties on us is so important and why our military focuses so heavily on "force protection"?
It is easy to see our losses and see our problems. But even when we don't see the pain and losses of our enemies, we have to remember that they are hurting too--maybe more than we are. I quoted Kipling in this post regarding our enemies in Iraq:
Man cannot tell but Allah knows
How much the other side is hurt.
Of course, the question of whether we can win must be tied to the question of whether the objective is important enough to endure the casualties needed to win. But do not become so focused on our losses that you think the most important thing we can do before entering a conflict is defining the level of our losses that should lead us to stop trying to win and instead retreat (the "exit strategy" that so many foolishly believe is the height of strategic thinking).
Even jihadis can get tired of fighting and dying if enough of them die. The Battle of Mogadishu demonstrated that (as did the Iran-Iraq War when Iranian morale broke in 1988).
