Stratfor writes of the threats of force:
The threat of war is useful only when the threat is real and significant. This threat, however, was intended to be insignificant. Something would be destroyed, but it would not be the chemical weapons or the regime. As a gesture, therefore, what it signaled was not that it was dangerous to incur American displeasure, but rather that American displeasure did not carry significant consequences. The United States is enormously powerful militarily and its threats to make war ought to be daunting, but instead, the president chose to frame the threat such that it would be safe to disregard it.
Stratfor doesn't believe we have a compelling reason to intervene in the civil war. I disagree. I believe we don't have a compelling reason to commit ground forces to the civil war. And I lean against intervention with air power, too. But I do think we have an interest in defeating Assad by supporting rebels who are fighting Assad.
Pre-deal interests in weakening Iran and Hezbollah are now joined with an interest in reversing Russia's gains, which Stratfor writes will unnerve small neighbors of Russia who believed they could count on us to resist Russian pressure.
But do please dump the notion that a display of American strength frightened the Syrian regime. They've suffered well over 40,000 government forces killed in this civil war. Who can really believe that tepid threats of a "unbelievably small" strike had much of an impact on Assad's thinking?
