After losing control of those outer reaches of his realm, Assad is now down to exactly that territory, including outposts still holding out in the eastern part of the country:
More than two years into Syria's civil war, the once highly-centralized authoritarian state has effectively split into three distinct parts, each boasting its own flags, security agencies and judicial system. ...
The regime holds a firm grip on a corridor running from the southern border with Jordan, through the capital Damascus and up to the Mediterranean coast, where a large portion of the population belongs to President Bashar Assad's Alawite sect. The rebels, who are primarily drawn from Syria's Sunni Muslim majority, control a chunk of territory that spans parts of Idlib and Aleppo provinces in the north and stretches along the Euphrates river to the porous Iraqi border in the east. Tucked into the far northeastern corner, meanwhile, Syria's Kurdish minority enjoys semi-autonomy. ...
While Sunni rebels control large swathes of Syria's rural regions in the north, the government still controls provincial capitals there, with the exception of Raqqa city and parts of Aleppo city. The regime also still retains some military bases and checkpoints in the overwhelmingly rebel-held countryside, but those are besieged and isolated and supplies for troops are air-dropped by helicopters or planes.
The Sunnis are divided into factions, including a sizable jihadi fighting element.
The big difference between what I suggested and what happened is that Assad crippled his loyal infantry in a futile effort to hold all of Syria. To make up for those casualties, now he relies on Hezbollah shock troops, a Shia Foreign Legion organized by Iran, and Alawite militias hastily organized with Iranian help. These provide the shooters for the shaken and tired regular army that retains dominance in the more technical branches such as mechanized forces and artillery. Assad's air power is worn out and not terribly decisive, which is why our military says a no-fly zone wouldn't do that much.
I haven't read anything about the casualties that the new militias have been taking, although early on I read they were being used as frontline forces rather than as garrisons to free up scarcer regular units for battle. Assad has held the initiative for the last several months, and has made gains. But the price to his new "infantry" has to be heavy given the rapid rise in overall casualties to 100,000 dead.
If government losses are leading the counter-offensive to reach its culminating point (basically the point that your offensive runs out of steam) without breaking the rebels, how will the morale of government forces hold up when the rebels start reclaiming the initiative in some areas?
UPDATE: Here's a rebel success despite Assad's offensives:
Syrian rebels captured a main military airport near the border with Turkey on Tuesday, consolidating their hold on a key supply route north of the city of Aleppo, opposition activists said. ...
Assad's forces tried last month to prevent the fall of the airport by launching an armored offensive from Aleppo, backed by Hezbollah guerrillas based in two Shiite villages near the city, to drive the rebels from the northern rural region, according to opposition sources in the north.
Rebels with newly received anti-tank weapons turned back the column.
If Assad's troops were expecting their flurry of activity this summer to finish off the rebels, failure to finish off the rebels could break an exhausted army.
