I've been puzzled that Air-Sea Battle efforts to penetrate Chinese anti-access weapons in order to operate near China haven't really said what we'd do with the ability to operate near China:
I know, the Navy likes to say that 80% of the world's people live within 300 miles of a coast, as a justification for their role. That's an interesting fact, but quite irrelevant. If I may be so bold, 100% of the world's people live on the land.
Which is my main point of contention with Air-Sea Battle. I have no problem with the idea that we need to be able to pierce China's anti-access forces to operate close to China. But what do we do when we pierce that shield? Sail around broadcasting, "Here we are and there's nothing you can do about it!"? Presumably, we should have a point for wanting to operate near China, no?
So this article by an admiral and Air Force general is welcome to read:
Air-Sea Battle is not a military strategy; it isn't about countering an invasion; it isn't a plan for U.S. forces to conduct an assault. Air-Sea Battle is a concept for defeating threats to access and enabling follow-on operations, which could include military activities as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster response. For example, in the last several years, improved integration between naval and air forces helped us respond to floods in Pakistan and to the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. [Emphasis added]
Although it is amusing, too. Chinese anti-access weapons will try to stop us from responding to floods or earthquakes? The point is, Air-Sea Battle enables follow-on operations. Which would be on land in or near China. If we simply wanted to bombard China, we could focus on building weapons to do that from beyond the range of China's anti-access forces.
And the authors describe the concept of breaking the kill chain of Chinese forces that seek to deny us access to regions near China:
Air-Sea Battle defeats threats to access by, first, disrupting an adversary's command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; second, destroying adversary weapons launchers (including aircraft, ships, and missile sites); and finally, defeating the weapons an adversary launches.
This approach exploits the fact that, to attack our forces, an adversary must complete a sequence of actions, commonly referred to as a "kill chain." For example, surveillance systems locate U.S. forces, communications networks relay targeting information to weapons launchers, weapons are launched, and then they must hone in on U.S. forces. Each of these steps is vulnerable to interdiction or disruption, and because each step must work, our forces can focus on the weakest links in the chain, not each and every one. For example, strikes against installations deep inland are not necessarily required in Air-Sea Battle because adversary C4ISR may be vulnerable to disruption, weapons can be deceived or interdicted, and adversary ships and aircraft can be destroyed.
Yes, this is precisely what I described more than two years ago in a lengthy post called "Breaking the Kill Chain."
The article authors add cyber-war to the took kit, but I tend to place more faith on things that explode on, jam, or confuse enemy assets. But I'm open to the possibility that one day cyber-warfare could be used against precise targets in as timely a fashion as launching a missile of some type.
Let's not lose sight of the land on the other side of our massive Air-Sea Battle investment in technology, tactics, and outlook.
